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AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 
Efi Zemach & Omri Ben-Zvi † 
It is widely agreed that no theory of contract is fully adequate—all theories face 
formidable descriptive, normative and conceptual difficulties. Why has contract 
scholarship failed to produce an acceptable theory of contract law, even after several 
decades of nuanced and sophisticated theoretical efforts? This Article answers this 
puzzle by offering a novel meta-theory of contract scholarship that focuses on the 
aesthetics of various contract theories. An aesthetic commitment, under this under-
standing, is a pre-theoretical presupposition regarding the form (as opposed to the 
substance) of legal discourse. The article argues that jurists harbor several different 
aesthetics and often employ them interchangeably and without noticing. The contin-
uing struggle between different contract theories is isomorphous to the battle of aes-
thetics that rages in the legal community as a whole. Since there is no meta-aesthetic 
way to determine which aesthetic construction is correct, contract theories, which are 
based on different aesthetics, are destined to continue struggling indefinitely. The 
article explores four leading contract theories—promissory, reliance, economic and 
pluralistic conceptions of contract—and illustrates the manner each theory’s substan-
tive insights are interwoven with aesthetics commitments, animating and giving the 
theories their unique character. In so doing, the article shows how the aesthetic point-
of-view can better explain these theories’ specific strengths, weaknesses and disagree-
ments, and it grounds its prediction that contract scholarship is not likely to produce 
a widely accepted theory any time soon. 
INTRODUCTION 
Contract theory is experiencing a long period of unrest. Decades of theoretical 
work, though highly sophisticated, have failed to establish the supremacy of one spe-
cific approach to contract law. Moreover, the intensity of criticism against any given 
theory has weakened the intellectual appeal of all to the point that many believe it 
impossible to find one coherent theory of contract law (whether unitary or pluralist). 
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for their invaluable comments. 
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This Article offers a novel way of dealing with this predicament. Instead of 
arguing for the supremacy of any existing contract theory, or advancing a new theory 
of contract law that supposedly meets all current objections, we take the current state 
of affairs in contract scholarship itself as the phenomenon that requires explanation. 
More specifically, we argue that a mode of inquiry, which explains the inability to 
rationally understand contract law, exists, but has gone unnoticed—until now. The 
article thus develops a novel descriptive theory of contract theories that aims to explain the 
troubling nature of the discourse on contract law and to shed light on attributes of 
the debate that have received little intellectual attention. 
Our methodology is philosophical. We employ a phenomenological perspective 
which focuses on the first-person experience of rational deliberation that is charac-
teristic to debates on the nature of contract. Instead of looking at the subject from 
an analytic, third-person viewpoint that tries to figure out which theory is objectively 
most justified, we highlight the fact that each of the prominent theories of contract 
situates jurists in different fields of discourse altogether—each theory of contract 
assumes a different way to construct its legal object of inquiry. We use the term “legal 
aesthetics” to capture this distinct experience of being situated in a specific legal 
space. The term “aesthetic” denotes pre-theoretical commitments to the form or 
structure of legal thought. These structural commitments animate legal discourse by 
dictating what is considered rational and plausible and which questions should be 
answered to better understand law. The first major claim of the article, then, is that 
the continuing debate about contract is fueled in large part by disagreements on an 
aesthetic level and is therefore rationally undecidable. 
To demonstrate our claim and explain the role of aesthetic thinking in law, we 
first provide two examples that are designed to trigger an immediate feeling of famil-
iarity with this type of experience. Following this procedure, we elaborate on these 
aesthetics and explain how they influence rational discourse. Consider, then, two 
common structures of experiencing the legal world: the grid and energy aesthetics. Both 
are discussed extensively by Pierre Schlag in his study of the aesthetics of American 
law.1 Here is what it is like to engage with law through the grid aesthetic (as aesthetics 
are phenomenological structures, we use the second person throughout our exam-
ples): 
Example I: The Troubled Friend 
A friend asks for your legal advice concerning a problem she has with her landlord. 
She tells you her story, which is long and full of particulars. In order to make sense of 
the situation, you immediately ask yourself, what kind of problem is this? And once this 
question is asked, the answer seems clear. Your friend’s claims are contractual; they do 
not involve torts or criminal law, for example. You continue this line of thinking and 
realize that, within contract law, the dispute centers on the doctrine of consideration, 
as nothing in the story brings up problems of offer and acceptance, breach of contract, 
                                                          
 1. See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002) [hereinafter Schlag, Aesthetics 
of American Law]. 
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etc. You recall the necessary and sufficient conditions for legally recognizing consid-
eration and tell your friend that the law is on her side in this case. 
This kind of reasoning should be extremely familiar to jurists, as we all apply 
grid-thinking in certain situations. The grid aesthetic frames law as a space that can 
be conclusively mapped. It divides law into clearly demarcated sections on a grid (i.e., 
contract/torts, or, within contract law, contract formation/breach of contract or of-
fer/acceptance/consideration/ remedies, etc.). Under this aesthetic, law is a stable, 
logical space governed by clear concepts with identifiable boundaries. The grid aes-
thetic conjures stability, logical coherency, and uniformity; within the grid, legal con-
cepts themselves (contract, right, remedy, etc.) are operative—they can reach “all the 
way down,” as it were, and decide concrete cases independently of other factors.2 
While this may seem like an old-fashioned understanding of law, the grid aesthetic is 
still relevant today, as The Troubled Friend example shows.3 For instance, consider any 
law school curriculum in common-law systems, which is still arranged in a grid-like 
fashion. 
In contrast, consider the phenomenology of legal reasoning under the energy 
aesthetic: 
Example II: The Judge 
A case comes before you that involves two shareholders that have made a certain ver-
bal agreement. The question is whether or not this agreement ought to be considered 
a valid contract. Some legal answers are possible, and you can think of several relevant 
legal precedents, but something about the case causes you to abstract from its specifics. 
The parties to the dispute are important, of course, but the question seems more fun-
damental—how do we want future parties to behave? You realize that any legal deter-
mination will necessarily interact with a host of incentives—ideological, financial, and 
legal—all of which direct shareholders’ behaviors. Thinking about the issue in this way: 
you determine that it ought to be decided that no contract has been made—labeling 
the agreement as a contract would influence the incentives of future shareholders in 
similar situations in a negative way. After realizing this, the legal precedents arrange 
themselves in your mind, and you are able to comfortably rule on the case. 
In the energy aesthetic, law is thought of as a force on the move, bringing 
change and transformation; “Law is on the march. It is progressing. Wealth is being 
maximized. Accidents are being deterred. Reform is on the way.”4 Note that this is a 
description of a general attitude or predisposition and not a theory about how law is 
or ought to be. Nor is it a metaphor for law, in the “law and literature” sense of the 
term. Committing to this aesthetic entails experiencing law as energy, not believing 
that it is like energy; the energy aesthetic is the name we give to a certain way of 
experiencing law as already given to us. For another example of energy-thinking, 
think of the manner law and economics scholars perceive the legal world, or consider 
                                                          
 2. DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 5 (2006) [hereinafter KENNEDY, 
THE RISE & FALL]. 
 3. See also Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 903-06 (1996) [hereinafter Schlag, Law and 
Phrenology]. 
 4. Schlag, Aesthetics of American Law, supra note 1, at 1071-72. 
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how a law professor may ask a student to discuss which policy law should enforce. 
In these cases, participants always find law in a pre-given structure—namely, on the 
move, competing with economic, cultural, and ideological forces that push and pull 
in different directions. It is this aesthetic that allows the practice of asking about law’s 
influence on society to become intelligible and responsive to rational argument in the 
first place. 
As these two examples show, we are all constantly engaged with different aes-
thetics. A given aesthetic is never fully adopted, nor is it truly abandoned; rather, 
jurists switch aesthetics regularly. For instance, we are all grid-thinkers when we teach 
law (i.e., we separate sharply between contract, torts and property classes), but we 
become energy-thinkers when we discuss legal doctrine as an instrument for further-
ing policy considerations. 
The article uses the grid and energy aesthetics, along with a third aesthetic, 
which we discuss later, to argue that, in many contract theories, aesthetic dispositions 
intertwine with substantive insights. Hidden aesthetic commitments influence the 
way jurists think of law by giving legal inquiry a certain form, and subsequently, lim-
iting the ways in which legal questions may be asked and answered. Ignoring the 
manner in which aesthetics direct the flow of inquiry can lead to an incomplete un-
derstanding of each theory’s insights, strengths and weaknesses, as well as to misin-
formed efforts to establish the superiority of any particular theory. 
To examine our claim, we focus on four major contract theories—promissory, 
reliance, economic, and pluralist conceptions of contract—determining the track of 
aesthetic disposition and substantive insights of each. We characterize the type of 
pre-theoretical commitments present in the various theories and chronicle the impact 
they make. For example, we argue that Charles Fried’s Contract-as-Promise relies on the 
grid aesthetic, while several reliance theorists—including Fuller and Perdue, Gilmore 
and Atiyah—share the energy aesthetic. As these theories rely on different aesthetics, 
one should not think of them as presenting different viewpoints on the same object, 
but as making different kinds of claims about different objects.5 
Our analysis serves two main functions. Our first and most important contri-
bution to contract scholarship is supplying a plausible descriptive theory of contract 
theory. We maintain that a purely descriptive theory is valuable in and of itself, re-
gardless of whether it serves a normative goal, because it reduces the realm of the 
unexplained and gives intelligible order to a complex institution which we do not fully 
understand otherwise. In contrast to many descriptive theories of contract law, our 
account does not focus on legal doctrine but rather on the theoretical discourse that 
seeks to interpret it. This (academic) type of inquiry is no better understood than the 
very object of its study, and indeed, some might even argue that contract theory is 
considerably less settled than contract law itself. Hence, contract theory also deserves 
                                                          
 5. Our argument in this regard challenges the familiar idea that law is a single “cathedral” whose counters the-
orists describe, or justify, from different viewpoints. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Eyal Zamir, Contract Law and 
Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2077 (2014). 
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a descriptive account of its own. In this regard, we maintain that our thesis is helpful 
in addressing the following three issues: 
(1) Our theory bears on the general, meta-level discourse on contract theory 
and explains why, despite many decades of valuable and insightful research, there still 
is no widely accepted theory of contract. Our explanation also predicts that this schol-
arship is not likely to produce a widely accepted theory any time soon. Law can be 
imaged through the prism of various, different aesthetic forms; all aesthetics are at-
tractive to some extent, and there is no way to rationally decide between legal aes-
thetics. Consequently, any particular contract theory might, at best, enjoy temporary 
acceptance within the legal community. 
Jeremy K. Kessler and David E. Pozen have recently hinted at a similar out-
come (at least regarding a specific sub-set of public law theories),6 but our underlying 
rationale differs considerably from theirs. In fact, the two claims are diametrically 
opposed—Kessler and Pozen believe that because legal theories are constantly de-
bated, they internalize criticism until they “reflect the conflict-ridden political and 
theoretical field [they have] promised to transcend.”7 We argue, on the other hand, 
that the theories of contract we discuss do not come in contact and are destined to 
talk past one another. 
(2) We also explain many concrete disagreements between contract theories. 
We argue that, in many instances, a supposedly rational (normative, descriptive, or 
conceptual) debate conceals an undecidable confrontation between different images 
of law. In debates between contract theories that endorse opposing pre-theoretical 
commitments, it is sometimes aesthetic commitments themselves, rather than sub-
stantive features of the theories, that prompt and sustain the dispute. Such disputes, 
which we refer to in this Article as “aesthetic-to-aesthetic debates,” cannot be con-
clusively adjudicated, since, as mentioned, there is no meta-aesthetic way to determine 
which aesthetic construction is correct. Thus, the theoretical debate continues, fueled 
(in part) by irreconcilable differences in aesthetic commitment. In other words, there 
is a certain point after which rational debate about contract ends, and something 
else—a naked aesthetic confrontation—begins. This important insight often remains 
unrecognized in contract scholarship. 
We identify some of these deadlocked points in which the dispute takes the 
form of an aesthetic-to-aesthetic confrontation. For instance, we argue that the fa-
mous debates over (a) whether grounding contract law in the binding force of prom-
ises entails, in and of itself, any normative guidelines or particular doctrinal results; 
and (b) whether a distinct moral category of “promise” or “will” is meaningful in any 
substantive sense—are aesthetically charged to such an extent that rational discussion 
simply cannot settle them. 
(3) Our thesis also offers a comprehensive explanation (but not a justification) 
for several contract theories, and shows that many of their insights—and fallacies—
                                                          
 6. See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life-Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 7. Id. at 4. 
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are in fact motivated by specific aesthetic dispositions. Over the years, the difficulties 
plaguing each individual theory of contract have been extensively detailed in contract 
scholarship. Our aesthetic analysis explains that some of these problems stem from 
certain aesthetic commitments. Thus, we do not obsess over any given theory’s falla-
cies, but rather explain why these mistakes took place in the first place. The article 
addresses many such errors. For example, we explain how Fuller and Perdue’s aes-
thetic commitments animate their puzzling (and powerfully criticized) assertion that 
the proof and quantification of expectation damages (which often demands hypo-
thetical and speculative evaluations) is easier than proof and quantification of reliance 
damages (which is based upon actual losses already incurred). We also address Fuller 
and Perdue’s perplexing claim that the reliance damages awarded should not exceed 
the value of the promised performance. Clearly, this view is inconsistent with Fuller 
and Perdue’s own normative position, according to which the repair of reliance dam-
ages is a central—and independent—goal of contract law. As we show, these errone-
ous, or inconsistent, assertions are naturally understood, or at least best explained, as 
a consequence of Fuller and Perdue’s aesthetic commitments to energy thinking. We 
also touch on their threefold classification of “interests” protected by remedies for 
breach of contract (expectation, reliance and restitution), which famously includes 
many conceptual and analytical fallacies. These difficulties too stem from Fuller and 
Perdue’s aesthetic dispositions. We argue that, contrary to what most of their cri-
tiques believe, Fuller and Perdue did not take their own classification too seriously. 
In the same vein, we clarify Contract as Promise’s many descriptive and conceptual 
flaws. For instance, we explain Fried’s preference for expectation damages, which 
seems inconsistent with his view that breaking a promise is, intrinsically, morally 
wrong. As Fried believes that contract doctrine is derived from an organizing moral 
principle of promise-keeping, adopting his view entails, arguably, preferring remedies 
that more strongly express the intrinsic moral significance of keeping a promise and 
the disapprobation of breaching it (such as specific performance, punitive damages, 
reliance damages that exceed the expectation interest, and disgorgement). Fried’s 
strong defense of expectation damages therefore seems out of place. We explain this 
anomaly by arguing that Fried’s endorsement of expectations damages is best ex-
plained by his pre-theoretical commitment to grid thinking.8 Our theory also explains, 
more generally, Fried’s insistence that contract doctrine is built on—and deduc-
tively derived from—the moral institution of promising, despite the considerable dis-
crepancies between contract and promise. We further discuss other difficulties of 
different theories, such as the common critique that pluralistic approaches are “anti-
theoretical.” 
The article thus explains these, and other, difficulties by arguing that they are 
not a result of analytical, logical, or conceptual stumbles. Rather, they stem from sub-
scribing to an aesthetic which partly guides the course of investigation. The result is 
that many criticisms against contract theories become intellectually uninteresting, as 
                                                          
 8. See infra part II.B. 
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they fail to recognize that the difficulties being attacked are not surprising—indeed, 
they are even predictable in a sense—when inspected through an aesthetic viewpoint. 
This explanation does not deny that each theory adds to the understanding of con-
tract. Nor do we suggest that any specific objection to any specific theory is false. We 
argue, instead, that all of these valuable truths need to be framed differently—namely, 
as stemming from the complicated dynamic of aesthetic commitments and substan-
tive insights. 
The second major contribution the article makes is to legal philosophy. The 
study of aesthetics and law has seen a slow but steady rise in the number of partici-
pants and level of sophistication. With that, until now, discussions have usually been 
carried out on a much more abstract level. Pierre Schlag, on whose work we partly 
rely, discussed the aesthetics of American law as a whole, and while he did offer some 
sporadic examples, it is difficult to understand from his work how to use the new 
language he introduced. Ours is one of the first attempts to employ aesthetics to 
explain a current legal predicament by applying aesthetic insights to contract theory.9 
Our discussion ensues as follows: Part I sets the stage for the investigation by 
discussing the article’s subject-matter and methodology. In Parts III through VI, we 
analyze specific contract theories: contract as promise (Part II), reliance (Part III), 
economic efficiency (Part IV), and pluralism (Part V), explicating our contention that 
aesthetic commitments influence contract theory. A short conclusion ends our dis-
cussion. 
I. SETTING THE STAGE 
A. The Subject-Matter: Contract Theory 
This subsection surveys various classifications of contract theory for the pur-
pose of identifying more precisely which theories of contract we discuss in Parts III 
through VI.10 We do not analyze all aspects of the classifications; rather, we only 
emphasize certain attributes of each theory. Yet, for the purposes of establishing a 
common point of departure, our limited focus is sufficient. However, as the need 
arises, additional insights are highlighted and discussed in more detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
                                                          
 9. For other attempts, see Heather Hughes, Aesthetics of Commercial Law: Domestic and International Implications, 67 
LA. L. REV. 689, 697 n. 25 (2007); Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 
53 BUFF. L. REV. 973 (2005-2006). 
 10. For a comprehensive overview of contract theories, see ERIC POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY (2011); 
STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (Peter Birks ed. 2004) [hereinafter SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY]; THE 
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS (Peter Benson ed. 2001) [hereinafter THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW]; 
see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS (2013); BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, 
THEORY AND CONTEXT 132-36 (2012); PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (Gregory Klass, 
George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds. 2014). For a useful typology of contemporary contract theories, based on several 
distinctions, see, Martijn W. Hesselink, Contract Theory and EU Contract Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU 
CONSUMER & CONTRACT LAW 508, 509-18 (Christian W. Twigg-Flesner ed., 2016) [hereinafter, Hesselink, Contract 
Theory]. 
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Generally speaking, contract theories can be divided into three categories: nor-
mative/evaluative, descriptive/analytic, and interpretive.11 This Article primarily ex-
amines interpretative theories, which merge normative and descriptive theses by pur-
porting to justify contract law as well as describe current doctrinal rules.12 An 
interpretive theory, as indicated by its name, seeks to produce a coherent interpreta-
tion of contract law; it aims to explain, to fit existing law, and to reconstruct contract 
doctrine in a manner that makes law appear as a harmonic, normative whole.13 
Another relevant classification separates monistic from pluralistic contract the-
ories. This Article discusses three unitary theories (promise, reliance and economic 
efficiency) as well as one variant of pluralism. Unitary theories aim to explain contract 
law based upon a single justificatory principle, while pluralistic theories assert that 
diverse principles “share the spotlight” in various possible ways.14 
A different categorization, which focuses on types of justificatory principles, 
divides theories into rights-based or utilitarian varieties.15 Rights-based theories sup-
port individual rights and duties and impose justice in a narrow sense (i.e., between 
                                                          
 11. See, e.g., Hesselink, Contract Theory, supra note 10, at 509-510, 516; Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the 
Question? Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 903 (2003) [hereinafter Craswell, In That Case]. 
Descriptive theories aim to describe existing law without expressing a normative argument, though they may some-
times be used as a means to advance a normative argument. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 374-75 (1990) (arguing that a positive economic theory also serves as a guide for normative deci-
sions); Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 104 (2000) (maintaining that Fuller and 
Perdue’s descriptive analysis is an attempt to “reinforce[]” their normative argument). Normative theories offer a 
desirable goal that is external to law. See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract 
Damages 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 835-36 (2007) [hereinafter Oman, Failure of Economic Interpretations]; Alan 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 133 YALE L.J. 541, 543 (2003). Normative 
theories might be further subdivided in various ways, such as into "comprehensive-normative-theories" and "value-
contingent-theories." Comprehensive normative theories pay more attention to explicit normative arguments; they 
aim to establish and justify the basic value upon which they are built. Value-contingent-theories make no special 
attempt to justify the value upon which they were built but rather to specify the normative consequences that are 
derived from this value.. See, e.g., Craswell, In That Case, supra, at 906-07; Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law 
After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 834 (2003) [hereinafter Posner, After Three Decades] (discussing 
normative economic analyses). 
 12. See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 10, at 4-5. The normative aspect of an interpretive theory, in 
contrast to a pure normative theory, does not evaluate law from an external normative premise but rather from a 
normative premise that is already employed in the cases studied. Additionally, the descriptive aspect of interpretive 
theories does not simply describe what courts do but is rather molded by the normative premise of the theory. See 
Craswell, In That Case, supra note 11, at 918-19. For a critique of the interpretative project. See, Richard Craswell, 
Contract Law, Default Rules and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 511-18 (1989) (discussing the problem-
atic nature of an attempt to justify a certain rule while basing the very justification upon existing law).  
 13.  See BIX, supra note 10, at 132 (arguing that interpretative theories engage in “rational reconstruction.”). See 
also Melvin A. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (forthcoming Sept. 2017); Peter A. 
Alces, The Moral Impossibility of Contract, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1647, 1647-52, 1650 n.4 (2007); Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 10, at 206, 213-22; PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 10, at 1.  
 14. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF 
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 3 (1997). For the general distinction between monist and pluralist 
theories, see, e.g., Hesselink, Contract Theory, supra note 10, at 513-515. 
 15. See SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 10, at 46-48 (using these terms); see also STEPHEN A. SMITH, 
ATIYAH’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 3-5 (6th ed. 2005). For information on additional, overlap-
ping classifications include Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 271 (1986) (discussing 
“party-based” versus “standards-based” theories); Jody Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 689 (2002) (discussing “economic contract” versus 
“autonomy” theories); Posner, After Three Decades, supra note 11, at 870-72 (discussing economic and philosophical 
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contracting parties themselves), irrespective of the contract’s broader social outcome. 
Utilitarian theories justify contract law by appealing to the contract’s effects on soci-
ety’s overall well-being. 
We discuss three leading theories of contract that present a single justificatory 
principle: promise, reliance, or efficiency. A promise-based theory views contract as 
a promise enforced by law—the legal obligation to perform a contract arises from 
the moral obligation to keep a promise. Normative arguments concerning the moral-
ity of promising rest upon deeper, more abstract ideas of free will and autonomy; the 
moral obligation to keep a promise stems from the promisor’s exercise of her free 
will and autonomy.16 
Reliance theories, in contrast, emphasize protection of the promisee and place 
normative weight on the promisee’s legitimate expectations and interests in not being 
harmed by reliance on a promise. Hence, a promise’s legally binding force is explained 
by additional elements, over and above the promise itself. These are commonly la-
beled as detrimental reliance and receipt of a benefit. This view challenges the dis-
tinctiveness of contract law, both with regard to its discrete place within private law 
and to its separate normative foundation. Properly understood, a contractual remedy 
is meant to cure wrongful infliction of harm and ultimately stems from normative 
notions of corrective justice.17 As such, contract is seen as an instantiation of the 
general category of tort.18 
While promissory and reliance theories are usually described as rights-based 
theories, economic efficiency, the third major theory we discuss, is a utilitarian theory. 
It is widely regarded as a promising contender among unitary contract theories.19 
Generally speaking, economic theorists believe that contract law promotes efficiency 
and enhances welfare (usually perceived as satisfaction of individual preferences). Alt-
hough economic theories spend a great deal of time constructing normative sugges-
tions20 (e.g., policy recommendations), they also descriptively explain contract law as 
bearing the “stamp of economic reasoning.”21 
Finally, a pluralist outlook insists that no unitary theory can capture or justify 
the entire sphere of contract law. Instead, conflicting theories and principles govern 
contract law simultaneously. Pluralist theories appear in many variants.22 Some are 
wholly pragmatic; they accept the disorder and contradictions in contract law and do 
                                                          
approaches); EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS AND MORALITY (2010) (discussing deontological 
versus consequentialist theories). For a discussion on instrumental versus noninstrumental/conceptual theories of 
contract law, see David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1815, 1818 (1991); Roy Kreitner, Fear of Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 429, 432-38 (2004). 
 16. See infra Section II.A, for a more comprehensive discussion on promissory theories.   
 17. By “[p]roperly understood,” we mean in one, strict, sense of this principle. See also infra note 101 for further 
discussion. 
 18. For further discussion, see also infra Part III. 
 19. See, e.g., Oman, Failure of Economic Interpretations, supra note 11, at 831; Kraus, supra note 15, at 687-88. For 
further discussion, see infra, Part IV. 
 20.  But see supra note 11, for a discussion on “value-contingent-theories.”  
 21.  RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25 (6th ed. 2003). 
 22. See infra notes 184-187 and the accompanying text for further discussion. 
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not strive to establish any internal theoretical order between disparate theories. Oth-
ers are more principled in nature. For example, they may assign different tasks or 
qualities to various theories (e.g., one theory is lexically prior to the other; each theory 
has different meta-theoretical objectives; one theory is “foundational” and the other 
is “derivative”). Some pluralist theorists seek to highlight a range of applications in 
which particular theories do not conflict, but rather converge. Consequently, they do 
not prioritize justifications. 
We now turn to briefly explore our study’s methodology. 
B. The Methodology: Aesthetics and Law 
This Article follows Pierre Schlag’s work23 by understanding aesthetics as pre-
theoretical forms through which jurists experience legal discourse.24 While this defi-
nition is distinct from the common understanding of aesthetics as the branch of phi-
losophy that supplies a theory of art or beauty, it is not altogether foreign to legal 
theory.25 Our use of the term “aesthetic” draws on phenomenology to capture a par-
ticular form of legal experience that is best described from the first-person perspec-
tive.26 More specifically, an aesthetic inquiry recognizes that when we think about 
and engage with law—as law students, lawyers, judges, and legal academics—we op-
erate within a framework that facilitates our experience. Though usually hidden, this 
framework surrounds and guides legal practitioners in understanding how to come 
in contact with and operate law. “[A]esthetic operates through us—choosing us, en-
acting us, directing us,”27 by placing us within a certain structure while focusing our 
attention on certain tasks rather than others. In short, aesthetic determines the way 
we are situated vis-à-vis law.28 
                                                          
 23. See Schlag, Aesthetics of American Law, supra note 1. 
 24. For major contributions to this field of study, see ADAM GEARY, LAW AND AESTHETICS (John Gardner ed., 
2001); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING SCHOLARSHIP (1999) [hereinafter 
KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW]; DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) 
(1997) [hereinafter KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION]; KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL, supra note 2; 
DESMOND MANDERSON, SONGS WITHOUT MUSIC: AESTHETIC DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE (Andrew Arato 
et al. eds. 2000); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) [hereinafter SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT]; 
Patrick O. Gudridge, Mit Schlag (Repetitions), 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 607 (2003); Hughes, supra note 8, at 697, n.25; 
Tamara Piety, Smoking in Bed, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827 (2003); Riles, supra note 9; Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A 
Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1989) [hereinafter Schlag, Missing Pieces]; David A. Westbrook, Pierre 
Schlag and the Temple of Boredom, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 649 (2003). 
 25. See, e.g., KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 24; Jack M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE 
L.J. 1669 (1990); Paul W. Kahn, Philosophy and the Politics of Unreason, 97 CAL. L. REV. 393 (2009); Riles, supra note 9; 
Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929 (1988). 
 26. See SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 24, at 98; cf. FRANK ANKERSMIT, SUBLIME HISTORICAL 
EXPERIENCE (2005). 
 27. Schlag, Aesthetics of American Law, supra note 1, at 1053. 
 28. See, e.g., MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 529 (Colin Smith trans. 
1962) (“I am a psychological and historical structure, and have received, with existence, a manner of existing, a style. 
All my actions and thoughts stand in a relationship to this structure.”); Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of 
Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1789 (1987); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 
(1990). 
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The underlying idea is that law always arrives steeped in some aesthetics or 
combination thereof. We cannot come in contact with formless law—for us, it is 
always an ensuing combination of words, people, institutions, history, mindsets, 
methodologies, and so on, all already presented, or thought about, in some form. In 
order to interact with law and to make it intelligible, practitioners must structure the 
object with which they are engaging, and this can be done in more than one way.29 
Students of legal aesthetics thus develop phenomenological accounts of the variety 
of forms the legal community uses in order to advance substantive arguments.30 For 
example, recall again how common it is to engage with law in the manner that was 
exemplified in The Troubled Friend and The Judge, and note that these two cases signify 
altogether different manners of constructing the legal object. 
The relationship between the aesthetic and substantive sides of a theory is sub-
tle and complex, but generally speaking, one might say that an aesthetic influences, 
but does not determine the course of analysis. The aesthetic side of a thesis entails 
commitment to certain types of explanations and justifications (it suggests that they 
are desirable/plausible/attractive, etc.), and disregard for others. With that, an aes-
thetic does not determine which specific insight one arrives at. For example, a grid-
thinker approaching a legal question naturally applies grid-techniques (classifications, 
categories, conceptual analysis, deductions, etc.). There is a sense in which this type 
of investigation is unconstrained, for the grid itself does not determine the actual 
results of the inquiry. But in another sense, a grid-thinker is led to search for specific 
types of answers and to only believe that specific phenomena require explanation. 
One might say that to subscribe to an aesthetic is analogous to committing in advance 
to only painting with a certain color. When one is only given a blue brush, one can 
still paint whatever one wants, and in this sense, the creative process is unconstrained. 
However, whatever the drawing will be, we know in advance that it will be blue. 
Hence, some questions about the drawing cannot be answered by an aesthetic inquiry 
(e.g., why did she paint a house?), others are explained rather naturally (e.g., why did 
she paint the house blue?), and still others are capable of partial explanation (e.g., why 
does she tend to only paint things that are blue in real life?). 
Because of this integration between substance and aesthetics, one cannot simply 
import a substantive insight into a different aesthetic without changing the nature of 
what one is saying; the “same” insight will be dramatically different under other aes-
thetics, because it will be positioned differently (i.e. it will be a tool for performing a 
different task). However, since aesthetic commitments are pre-theoretical,31 there are 
                                                          
 29. See KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL, supra note 2, at 5; STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004). 
 30. See Gudridge, supra note 24; Hughes, supra note 24; Schlag, Aesthetics of American Law, supra note 1; Schlag, 
Law and Phrenology, supra note 3; Schlag, Missing Pieces, supra note 24. 
 31. For example, consider Kennedy’s discussion of two law school experiences (working on a law review note 
and on a legal brief) that triggered his “loss of faith” in law. KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 
24, at 313 (“One must go through something more than a [rational] critique.”). See also KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF 
ADJUDICATION, supra note 24, at 313 (emphasis added). 
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no theoretical grounds for leaving an aesthetic or subscribing to another. Addition-
ally, there is no meta-aesthetic a-priori calculation that determines which aesthetic is 
appropriate or correct.32 These kinds of rational standards come after one has com-
mitted to an aesthetic. Thus, the very act of deciding which questions are relevant in 
a given legal situation depends on the operative aesthetic already employed.33 For 
example, The Judge was designed to show that we commit to an aesthetic very quickly 
and without direct rational deliberation, and in this sense, the aesthetic “chooses” us 
and not the other way around. 
In addition, legal practitioners do not rely on one single aesthetic; on the con-
trary, jurists harbor different, conflicting aesthetics routinely.34 In fact, we tend to 
switch between aesthetics without noticing.35 For instance, note how easy it is to 
switch between the two mindsets that were presented in The Judge and The Troubled 
Friend: 
Example III: The Law Professor 
You are a realist law professor who teaches contract law. On Monday, you write a 
paper arguing that a given contract law doctrine is best understood as a reaction to 
certain social pressures (suggesting energy aesthetics). Preparing for your class on 
Tuesday, however, you outline the lecture distinguishing between tort/property/con-
tract and contract formation/consideration/mistake/ remedies, etc. (supporting grid 
aesthetics). Although these two projects demand different conceptualizations of law, 
switching between them generates no feeling of contradiction or cognitive disso-
nance.36 
Finally, we briefly address the claim that our discussion of aesthetics is prob-
lematic, since our explanation of aesthetics is also dictated by a certain aesthetic itself. 
For example, it may very well be that our own classifications reflect a commitment 
to grid-thinking. We concede this point but argue that it is of little importance. Of 
course, everything said here can be understood differently according to various aes-
thetics. One can, for example, focus on the sharp demarcation between the grid and 
energy aesthetics (grid-thinking), or consider the real-world implications of aesthetic 
theory for practicing lawyers (energy-thinking). Aesthetics are a way of being in the 
world and cannot, by themselves, make anything correct or incorrect (although they 
can make things sound more or less convincing). The fact that our analysis is open 
to different aesthetic readings does not pose a problem for the project.37Surely, this 
                                                          
 32. See KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL, supra note 2, at xviii. 
 33. See Schlag, Aesthetics of American Law, supra note 1, at 1105 (“[O]nce a dispute becomes explicitly aesthetic, 
rational argument has reached a kind of terminus.”); see also MANDERSON, supra note 24, at 10-11; KAHN, THE 
CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 24, at 102. 
 34. This makes the concept of a legal aesthetic very different from Fish’s “interpretive community.” See Fish, 
supra note 28; see also Winter, supra note 28. 
 35. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1776 (1976); 
Schlag, Aesthetics of American Law, supra note 1, at 1100. 
 36. See JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278-93 (Alan Bass trans., 2001) (arguing that human 
history is fraught with changes in “centers of structure.”).  
 37. See Schlag, Aesthetics of American Law, supra note 1, at 1101-04; cf. Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 869, 921-27 (1988) (applying an argument about rhetoric in law to his own article). 
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short discussion of aesthetics leaves many questions unanswered, but instead of de-
veloping a more nuanced philosophical account, we move to our chosen field of in-
quiry—contract theory—and show how legal aesthetics dramatically influence our 
experience of legal rules, norms, and doctrines. 
II. CONTRACT AS PROMISE 
A. Introduction 
We begin our discussion by examining Charles Fried’s autonomy-based the-
ory,38 which he introduced in his seminal Contract as Promise.39 Very briefly stated, 
Fried believes that contracts are binding because promises hold intrinsic moral value: 
“[S]ince a contract is first of all a promise,” Fried states, “the contract must be kept 
because a promise must be kept.”40 Contract law thus rests on a “convention . . . of 
promising,” a general cultural understanding that allows one party to be bound to 
another in the manner that creates expectations and trust between both sides.41 By 
facilitating private agreements of the will, this convention increases one’s options in 
the long run42 and enhances freedom and autonomy. The convention of promising 
is, therefore, a necessary device by which individuals meet goals and purposes by 
enlisting the collaboration of other free persons.43 Fried further maintains that break-
ing a promise is a breach of the trust we invoke when we promise, and as such it 
amounts to an unjustified act, per the Kantian injunction against using another as 
means for promoting one’s goals.44 At the same time, by forcing a promisor to keep 
her promise, we respect her capacity as a free, rational, and autonomous moral 
agent.45 
Fried’s account of contract as promise is not a “pure” normative theory, though 
some scholars have suggested that it could be best understood as such.46 It is actually 
                                                          
 38. For other autonomy-based theories, see, e.g., Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, supra note 15 (placing the 
element of "consent," instead of promise, at the center of contract law). Consider also "transfer-theories", which 
view the contractual obligation as akin to the transfer of property-like entitlements. See, e.g., Peter Benson, Contract as 
a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2007); Andrew S. Gold, Contract as Property, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
1 (2009). See also Kraus, supra note 15. 
 39. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). Fried further discussed and honed his argument in 
Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. FORUM. 1 (2007) (responding to Seana Val-
entine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007)) [hereinafter Fried, Convergence]; 
Charles Fried, “Contract as Promise” Thirty Years On, 45 SUFFOLK L. REV. 961 (2012) [hereinafter Fried, Thirty Years 
On]; Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT L., supra 
note 10, at 17 [hereinafter Fried, Ambitions]; CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (2nd ed., 2015) [hereinafter 
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, 2ND]. 
 40. Id. at 17.  
 41. Id. 
 42. See Dori Kimel, Personal Autonomy and Change of Mind in Promise and in Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 10, at 100-02, on the issue of regret and promoting autonomy in the 
long run in promissory theories of contract. 
 43. Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 38, at 962. 
 44. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 16-17. 
 45. Id. at 20-21.  
 46. For example, see Kraus, supra note 15, at 703-32.  
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an interpretive theory; Fried specifically points to the main themes of contract doc-
trine and strives to demonstrate that existing (American) contract law can be largely 
justified on the basis of a promissory obligation.47 
We do not pursue the merits of Fried’s substantive arguments; nor do we focus 
on the plausibility of his normative, or conceptual, assumptions.48 Instead, we use 
Fried’s theory to demonstrate how aesthetic choices make a difference. While these 
choices remain unstated throughout his discussion, they influence his claims dramat-
ically. Above all, Fried succeeds in persuading his readers to accept his aesthetics 
without question. When this works, Fried wins a substantial intellectual victory: we 
are with him for the ride, so to speak, by tacitly agreeing that we are, in fact, situated 
in the space he envisions. There is a moment in the analysis—call it the “aesthetic 
moment”—when we accept the structure through which a notion is conveyed to us. 
This usually happens very quickly, and often unconsciously. Yet, it has a tremendous 
impact on the phenomenology of accepting an intellectual argument (in our case, a 
theory about contract law). Subsection III.B demonstrates that Fried uses the grid 
aesthetic in his treatise on contract, and subsection III.C discusses several conse-
quences that flow from our aesthetic analysis. 
B. Aesthetics 
In this subsection, we advance an exegetical claim, according to which Contract 
as Promise invokes the grid aesthetic. The aesthetic side of Fried’s work is uncovered 
when attention is paid to the kinds of tasks that Fried is interested in performing. 
Above all, Fried wants to situate contract within a broader framework that encom-
passes both law and morality. Consequently, the principle question that Fried asks 
repeatedly, and regarding any object of inquiry (promise, contract, offer and ac-
ceptance, consideration, expectation damages, etc.), is where this object figures in the 
overall normative structure. This question is then answered by identifying the object’s 
borders vis-à-vis other conceptual notions (e.g., contract is a manifestation of the 
                                                          
 47. For further discussion, see infra note 61 and accompanying text. Elsewhere, Fried tries to maintain the coher-
ence of American contract doctrine with regard to the promise principle in varied strategies. See, e.g., infra note 85-87.  
 48. For criticism on Fried’s derivation of legal duty to perform promises from a moral duty, see ROBERT E. SCOTT 
& JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 25 (3d ed. 2003); SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 10, at 
69-78; Brian H. Bix, Theories of Contract Law and Enforcing Promissory Morality: Comments on Charles Fried, 45 SUFFOLK L. 
REV. 719, 724-726 (2012); Joseph Raz, Book Review, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 937 (1982). 
But see Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 39, at 974-75 (responding to this line of critiques). For critical discussion on 
the connection between enforcing promises and respect for autonomy, see PATRICK ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS 
AND LAW 128-29 (1981); SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 48, at 25; Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a 
Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO. L. REV. 1077, 1115 (1989); 
Curtis Bridgeman, Liberalism and Freedom from the Promise Theory of Contract, 67 MOD. L. REV. 684, 687 (2004); Kimel, 
supra note 42; see also infra note 79; but see FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 14. 
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 52 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss2/18
 2017] CONTRACT THEORY AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 181 
 
inherent moral value of promising).49 This technique reveals that Fried’s analysis is 
steeped in an aesthetic form that only allows this type of question to be asked.50 
The overall structure of Contract as Promise can be illustrated as thus: 
FIGURE I 
 
Within the world that Fried builds in Contract as Promise, to explain the nature of 
contract, or specific contract doctrines, just is to locate them on the grid. The grid 
thus provides the overall aesthetic of investigation. In what follows, we chronicle 
Fried’s deductive, grid-thinking process in more detail. 
Fried’s argument starts by positing the Kantian ethics of trust and respect as a 
“sure foundation” from which to continue.51 Relying on this “fact of the matter,” 
Fried continues to identify the “device that gives trust its sharpest, most palpable 
form.”52 Promise, according to Fried, is a distinct moral category. It is a subset de-
rived from the broader Kantian intuition and is distinguished from other moral prin-
ciples, such as harm or reliance.53 The intentional acceptance of obligation, and the 
consequential default of that obligation, is what separates this act from other harmful 
                                                          
 49. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 17 ("The moralist of duty… sees promising as a device that 
free, moral individuals have fashioned on the premise of mutual trust, and which gathers its moral force from that 
premise. The moralist of duty thus posits a general obligation to keep promises, of which the obligation of contract 
will be only a special case"). 
 50. Contract as Promise's grid structure of thought is readily recognizable in Fried's summarization of his theory. 
See Fried, Ambitions, supra note 39, at 21 ("We start with respect, which allows trust, which allows language, which 
finally allows the institution of promising").See also Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 39, at 978 ("…promise is the 
human institution that expresses a morality of human freedom, of the expansion of the human will in relations of 
respect and trust, and… contract is the legal institution that is built on the moral institution of promising: hence 
contract as promise"). 
 51. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 7. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 14. 
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acts.54 Thus, promise alone supplies the ground for other normative categories, such 
as reliance. 55 
After locating promise, Fried’s next move is to explore the larger category of 
convention, which is located above promise on the grid.56 The “logical structure of 
conventions in general” is for him, the reason promises create normative duties:57 
promise just is a convention which “make[s] nonoptional a course of conduct that 
would otherwise be optional.”58 Promises signify society’s decision that intentions 
make a normative difference. 
In response, some might wonder whether something else (e.g. reliance) could 
do the mandatory normative work here.59 We suggest, however, that even to ask this 
question is to accept Fried’s aesthetic and to establish an argument from within its 
structure. Fried takes up these types of objections himself by extensively discussing 
reliance, harm, etc., and in doing so, he remains within the grid aesthetic. This type 
of investigation is framed in a very specific manner—we are looking for an element 
that would figure neatly in our conceptual map. And since the guidelines for the 
search specifically call for distinct, enunciated data; therefore, “One can only find what 
the search allows in the sense that the search fails to recognize anything else.”60 
Fried then continues to rely on the grid when he elucidates the notion of con-
tract and comments on the details of contract law itself (recall that his theory is inter-
pretative and, as such, strives to account for existing law). Contract is thus “rooted 
in,” and underwritten by, “the morality of promising,” and “the legal institution of 
contract is grounded in the moral institution of promise.”61 As for the contract doc-
trine, Fried proceeds by identifying clear intellectual categories and deducing from 
the general to the concrete. 
The doctrine of offer and acceptance, for example, is an adaptation of a “feature 
of promising”62 What gives offer and acceptance this characteristic is that its explan-
atory force is the actual concept of a promise—which is operative here: it can reach 
down into law and settle how legal rules can and should look. In this case, this is 
because “a promise, to be complete, to count as a promise, must in some sense be 
                                                          
 54.  Charles Fried, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract By P.S. Atiyah, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1858, 1863 (1980) (book 
review) [hereinafter Fried, Book Review]; see also Curtis Bridgeman & John C.P. Goldberg, Do Promises Distinguish Con-
tract from Tort?, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 873, 874 (2012). 
 55.  See Fried, Book Review, supra note 54, at 1863. 
 56. See, e.g., Fried, Ambitions, supra note 39, at 21; contra Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY 
OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 10, at 98-99; Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199 (1990). 
 57. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 12. 
 58. Id. at 13. 
 59. We discuss reliance-based arguments in Part III.  
 60. SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 26, at 4 (emphasis in original).  
 61. Fried, Convergence, supra note 39, at 3; see also Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 39, at 17 (“Contract as Promise had 
its overriding ambition connecting a number of salient doctrines of contract law to—indeed deriving them from—a 
central organizing moral and doctrinal principle: the promise principle.”). (emphasis added).  
 62. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 40. 
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taken up by its beneficiary.”63 This means that Fried’s entire discussion of offer and 
acceptance is plausible only if the grid aesthetic is already in place, facilitating the 
discussion. If we “zoom-in” on the notion of contract from Figure I, we see that offer 
and acceptance is simply a logical component of contract itself: 
FIGURE II 
 
A second example is expectation damages. For Fried, this doctrine represents a 
natural corollary to the promise principle. Expectation damages have a “palpable” 
connection with the “nature” of contract,64 deriving directly from the fact that a con-
tract is essentially a promise enforced by law.65 Herein, Fried again moves from the 
general to the concrete. His justification in this case takes the following form (again, 
“zooming-in” on contract for the sake of simplicity, but now including the doctrine 
of offer and acceptance):66 
FIGURE III 
 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 41. Notice that many other conceptual approaches to contract law share this tendency to find direct 
conceptual relations between the basis of liability and the specific doctrine of offer and acceptance. See, e.g., Benson, 
Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, supra note 38, at  1710; Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract, in THE THEORY OF 
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 10, at 138-49. 
 64. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 17-21. 
 65. Id. at 4 (“To enforce a promise as such is to make a defendant render a performance . . . just because he has 
promised that very thing.”).    
 66. Id. at 17 (“If I make a promise to you, I should do as I promise; and if I fail to keep my promise, it is fair that 
I should be made to hand over the equivalent of the promised performance. In contract doctrine this proposition appears as the 
expectation measure of damages for breach.”). (emphasis added).  
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A conceptual grid is thus literally beginning to materialize. Recall for a moment 
the Troubled friend example and note how easy it is, when the grid is fully formed, to 
think of law through this structure of consciousness: a legal question quickly becomes 
an exercise in superimposing the facts of the case on top of the grid in order to 
ascertain where we are.  
As a third and final example, consider Fried's similar discussion of the idea that 
an offeree is free to accept any contractual offer until it is withdrawn. Fried writes: “I 
think there are no reasons in principle [for not allowing this], nothing entailed by the 
concepts themselves.”67 This comment reveals what Fried thinks of reasons and reason-
giving, and how he conceptualizes the space within which his theory is offered. 
While Fried has many contesters, his argument seems plausible to many jurists. 
When one listens to Fried’s rhetoric for some time, it is hard to remember that the 
grid is entirely optional, as we experienced in the “aesthetic moment” that converted 
us to grid-thinking long ago. 
C. The Upshot 
What flows from the fact that Fried’s theory of contract is dependent on grid-
thinking? This subsection discusses two major consequences. 
1. Explaining Contract as Promise’s Weaknesses 
Our aesthetic discussion provides an important framework for discussing the 
weaker points of Fried’s theory. As we claim above, our thesis is that many of these 
problems are best explained as by-products of grid-thinking. To reiterate the point, 
the connection between aesthetic commitments and substantive insights is not one 
of logical necessity, but a more subtle (but stubborn) influence on the course of in-
quiry. We provide two examples. 
First, many have objected to the sharp distinction that Fried makes between 
reliance, promise, and harm. For example, it has been noted that a promissory theory 
has indeterminate doctrinal results and that a legally binding promise might, or 
                                                          
 67. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 49 (emphasis added). 
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should, in fact, protect reliance.68 Clearly, in such cases, the distinct label of “prom-
ise” ceases to do any meaningful work.69 Furthermore, a promise-based obligation, 
even one based on autonomy, might equally qualify as an instantiation of a more basic 
category of the corrective justice principle,70 or as an implication of the Millian harm 
principle.71 Indeed, Fried’s own explicit notions of “trust” and “respect” appear to 
be almost synonymous with some of their rivals, seemingly bringing Fried closer to 
the idea of reliance.72 
The curious fact is that Fried insisted on the distinction between promise and 
other normative notions despite being aware of all this criticism.73 Why is this so? 
We suggest that analyzing this point using an aesthetic perspective provides an expla-
nation for Fried’s pre-theoretical motivation. The grid aesthetic is not a rational con-
struct, but a commitment to a certain form of legal consciousness, so it can remain 
operative even in the face of criticism. Thus, Fried remains committed to the task of 
policing the grid. As he says himself: “A major concern of this book is the articulation 
of the boundaries and connection” between promise and other conceptions.74 In other 
words, Fried is aesthetically predisposed to stick to conceptual distinction even when 
they begin to fail. 
The same explanation applies to our second example, which concerns Fried’s 
insistence on placing the notion of contract (and contract law) under promise on the 
grid. Many theorists have criticized Fried by arguing that his thesis, the promissory 
notion, fits poorly into existing contract law. Some critics have pointed to the fact 
                                                          
 68.  See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 58-59 
(1936) (explaining that a promise-based theory does not logically entail any conclusive guidelines with regard to the 
remedy, and that in many circumstances, a promissory obligation does not, by itself, produce a “ready-made solution 
for the problem of damages.”) [hereinafter Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest]; see also Craswell, Contract Law, Contract 
Law, Default Rules and the Philosophy of Promising, supra note 12, at 519 (arguing that reliance measure of damages can be 
also supported by a non-reliance-based justification for the binding force of promises, such as the will theory); accord 
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 106-08 
(1989); accord, infra text accompanying notes 88-89 and note 144; see also Scanlon, Promises and Practices, supra note 56, 
at 216 (1990) (It follows that a promise-based regime of contract damages may still be equally compatible with a rule 
awarding reliance damages); but cf. Eyal Zamir, The Missing Interest: Restoration of The Contractual Equivalence, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 59, 105 (2007) [hereinafter Zamir, The Missing Interest].  
 69. See Richard Craswell, Expectation Damages and Contract Theory Revisited (Stanford Law School, John M. Olin 
Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 325, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=925980. [hereinafter 
Craswell, Expectation Damages]. See infra text accompanying notes 119-20.   
 70. If a promise is a source of entitlements, its breach is a disturbance of a status quo which justifies a correction 
by virtue of corrective justice. See Bridgeman & Goldberg, supra note 54, at 874.  
 71. The harm principle is usually perceived as an objection to promissory theories. See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, 
Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2005) [hereinafter Oman, Unity and Pluralism in 
Contract Law]. However, giving force to bare promises might be derived from perceiving a mere frustration of expec-
tations as a “harm” for the purposes of the harm principle. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 48, at 937-38; cf. Patrick S. Atiyah, 
Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 10, 45 (1986) (discussing and criticizing parts 
of Raz’s view) [hereinafter Atiyah, Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations]. 
 72. See, e.g., Patrick Atiyah, The Liberal Theory of Contract, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 121, 148 (1986) [hereinafter 
Atiyah, The Liberal Theory of Contract]; Anthony T. Kronman, A New Champion for the Will Theory, 91 YALE L.J. 404, 
411-12 (1981) (reviewing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
(1981).  
 73. Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 39, at 961, 978; see Jeffery Lipshaw, Contract as Meaning: An Introduction to 
“Contract as Promise” at 30, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 601, 623 (2012), for a response to Fried. 
 74. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 25 (emphasis added).  
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that courts do not enforce all promises and also enforce non-promissory arrange-
ments.75 In addition, many rules of contract law equitable doctrines such as:76 the 
doctrine of consideration,77 the rule of mitigation,78 objective theory of contract for-
mation,79 the remedy of expectation damages,80 the Hadley case rule,81 the relative 
inattention to moral culpability in breach,82 the unavailability of punitive sanctions 
even on an intentional breach or through liquidated damages,83 and other default 
rules or “gap-filling” rules84—are at odds with the promissory principle. 
                                                          
 75. See FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 3; see also, Atiyah, Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obli-
gations, supra note 71, at 19-28; cf. Atiyah, The Liberal Theory of Contract, supra note 72, at 121-49; see SCOTT & KRAUS, 
supra note 48, at 25; BIX, supra note 10, at 133; SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 10, at 151-56; see Dori Kimel, 
The Morality of Contract and Moral Culpability in Breach, 21 KING L.J. 213, 215-16 (2010) (grouping the many discrepancies 
around two main elements: voluntariness and fault) [hereinafter Kimel, The Morality of Contract].  
 76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981), for example such as promissory estoppel. See also 
Hoffman vs. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 133  N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965); see Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract 
Law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 61 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999), for explanation that prom-
issory estoppel could also be interpreted as actually promoting promises and private arrangements by declining for-
malities. Furthermore, it seems that courts deny in fact recovery for pre-contractual reliance, in the absence of a clear 
“promissory” ground (namely, statements of intention to be bound). See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontrac-
tual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 673 (2007).  
 77. Atiyah, The Liberal Theory of Contract, supra note 72, at 127; BRIDGEMAN, supra note 48, at 687; see, e.g., J.E. 
Penner, Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of Contract, 2 LEGAL THEORY 325, 328-30 (1996); but see SMITH, 
CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 10, at 151 (arguing that the doctrine of consideration is consistent with rights-based 
theories).  
 78. Atiyah, The Liberal Theory of Contract, supra note 72, at 124; Seanna Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract 
and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 724-26 (2007). See FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 131; Fried, 
Ambitions, supra note 39, at 7-9, 28-29.   
 79.  See Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, supra note 15, at 269, 272-74; accord Randy E. Barnett, Contract is Not 
Promise; Contract is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK. L. REV 647, 650-652 (2012); ATIYAH, Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obli-
gations, supra note 71, at 21-22; Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, supra note 13, at 233; but see Lon L. Fuller, Consideration 
and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 808 (1941) (claiming that the objective theory of contract does not contradict the 
will theory or the principle of autonomy). See also Fried, 2012, supra note 39, at 974 (clarifying that the objective 
doctrine should not be seen as a normative contradiction with his view of contract as promise); Wayne Barnes, The 
Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1129 (2008) (demonstrating that the objective theory furthers the 
ideal of personal autonomy rather than restricts it); LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS: HORNBOOK SERIES 9 (2d 
ed. 1965) (arguing that the external manifestation is inherent in the very idea of promise).  
 80. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 78, at 722-23; see also Atiyah, The Liberal Theory of Contract , supra note 72, at 124; 
SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 10, at 154. Many have asserted that if contract law was grounded in the will 
theory, or the morality of promising, then the appropriate remedy should more express the moral duty to keep one’s 
promise. For a survey of many arguments of this sort (with regard to varied remedies, such as specific performance, 
reliance damages exceeding the expectation interest, disgorgement and punitive damages); see Zamir, The Missing In-
terest, supra note 68, at 105; see also Louis Kaplow &. Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, n. 
334 (2001) (“[I]t is well understood that expectation damages encourage breach . . . whereas specific performance or 
punitive damages would tend to deter–and, in the case of specific performance, undo–precisely these sorts of 
breaches.”) (emphasis added); accord Nathan B. Oman, Promise and Private Law, 45 Suffolk L. Rev. 935, 942-48 (2012) 
(suggests four possible direct connections between expectation damages and the promise principle and further ex-
plains why neither of these suggestions is truly successful in establishing such a connection); but see Fried, Thirty Years 
On, supra note 39, at 971 (endorsing the view that expectation damages are provided only as a majoritarian default 
remedy, and not as a necessary implication of the promissory obligation).   
 81.  See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 ENG. REP. 145 (1854); see also Shiffrin, supra note 78, at 724.  
 82. See Kimel, The Morality of Contract, supra note 75, at 215-16, 225-27 (arguing that the negligible role that faults 
plays in contract law raises a “startling discrepancy” between contract and promise). 
 83.  SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 10, at 155; Shiffrin, supra note 78, at 726-27. 
 84. Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, supra note 12, at 521-23 (discussing impracticability, frustration, mistake 
and good faith); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 822-
23 (1992) (discussing gap-filling rules); see also Barnett, Contract is Not Promise, Contract is Consent, supra note 79, at 652-
53 (describing the problem of gap-filling as a “strike” for contract as promise).   
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Expectedly, the many divergences of contract and promise did not prevent 
Fried from holding fast to the grid aesthetic. The best that Fried can do is state the 
connection between promise is a bit "overstated," 85 and address some of the worries 
mentioned above.86 However, Fried cannot fully retreat from the basic idea that con-
tract is rooted in promise, because the aesthetic dimensions of his project push him 
in the direction of finding answers of this very type. As he states: “at the end of the 
day . . . I still believe that Contract as Promise is correct to locate as the generating genius 
of this body of law the promise principle.”87 This quote reveals more about the nature 
of the inquiry (finding a “generating genius of this body”) than about the specific 
answer that the inquiry provides. Fried’s aesthetic sympathies condition him into try-
ing to find some well-defined normative rubric to explain contract doctrine, and the 
idea that no such rubric can fit the bill is simply beyond the scope of what his aesthetic 
allows. 
2. Aesthetic-to-Aesthetic Battles 
In the Introduction, we argued that some prominent disagreements in contract 
theory are undergirded by different aesthetic commitments. We locate the first such 
instance in the debate between Fried and Richard Craswell on the connection be-
tween the category of [promise] and [contract remedies]. Craswell is known for his 
economic perspective on law, which relies on a different aesthetic—the energy aes-
thetic, which we discuss in the Introduction. We return to economic theories of con-
tract in Part IV, but for now, it is enough if we realize that Craswell is determined to 
ask what contracts do instead of what they are. From this perspective, Craswell begins 
to unravel the tight connection between promises and actual results in the world. 
                                                          
 85. Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 39, at 974 (“Thus my claim in Contract as Promise about the relation of the 
legal regime of contract to the moral institution of promising was not so much wrong as overstated.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 39; Fried, Convergence, supra note 39; FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, 
2ND, supra note 39 (discussing, among many other issues, contract law’s preference for expectation damages over 
specific performance, the objective approach to contract, and the rule of mitigation). See also Kimel, The Morality of 
Contract, supra note 75, at 216-17; Seana V. Shiffrin, Are Contracts Promises?, in ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012). 
Following Shiffrin's classification of responses to the claim of divergence between contract and promise, Fried deals 
with divergent doctrines through varied strategies. Among these are: (I) to regard these doctrines as targets of reform 
and criticism (e.g., Fried's discussion about the doctrine of consideration and litigation costs, see, respectively, FRIED, 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 28-39; Fried, Convergence, supra note 39, at 6) (II) to recharacterize the 
divergent rules or the connection between them and the promise principle (e.g. labeling expectation damages not as 
a necessary implication of the promise principle but as a "default majoritarian rule") (III) to explain divergent doc-
trines by appeal to reasons that distinctive to features of legal enforcement or regulation; these render it sensible for 
the legal treatment of such promises to differ from their moral treatment (e.g. explaining the objective theory of 
contract formation and interpretation, the regime of default rules and the rule of mitigation as "practical necessities"; 
or explaining law's treatment of gratuitous promises and unconscionable bargains as stemming from "law's resources 
and preferences"). 
 
 87. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, 2ND, supra note 39, at 133 (summarizing his comments to the many critiques 
of his thesis); see also, Fried, Ambitions, supra note 39, at 18. 
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As he notes, the substance of any given promise is contingent, and therefore, 
no a-priori connection can be drawn between promises and specific remedies. Cras-
well states, “Fried’s conclusion about what remedy should actually be awarded seems 
to require a prior decision as to what remedy was expressly or implicitly promised.”88 
Thus, according to Craswell, a promise-based theory does not entail, in and of itself, 
conclusive consequences with regard to the remedy, and almost every remedy might 
be consistent with a promissory regime.89 We argue that this seemingly intellectual 
disagreement is animated by dissimilar aesthetic commitments. Craswell is not ob-
jecting to a particular claim; instead, he challenges the very image upon which Fried’s 
argument is designed by denying the importance of the distinct rubric of “promise.” 
In his view, this category eventually dissolves in its own contingencies, and is there-
fore, not an operative concept in a rigid grid, which entails conclusions in and of 
itself. According to Craswell, then, nothing is entailed by the “promise” concept it-
self. Craswell is, in effect, emptying promise of its conceptual essence and thinking 
of it and subsequently, of law itself, as a force on the move. Conversely, when Fried insists 
that promise is a morally important category with an intrinsic value, or that expecta-
tion damages (and other doctrines) are directly derivable from the essential nature of 
the rubric “promise,” he is using a quite different picture, a grid picture, of law. Put 
sharply, Fried and Craswell make different kinds of claims about different objects. 
To a large extent, they are talking past each other. The whole point of Fried’s study 
of contract is to place certain categories of thought promises, contracts, etc., on a 
stable map that shows contract’s connections to both morality and legal doctrine. 
This is not a “decision,” but an aesthetic fact about the scope of Fried’s project. 
The question of the connection between promise and legal remedies thus can-
not be answered in the abstract, before one has an operative aesthetic in place—as 
the aesthetic provides the motivating force for choosing a type of answer to this ques-
tion (e.g. should the answer provide us with a location on a map, or a description of 
an action in the world). Realizing this, Craswell and Fried have two options: either 
one of them adopts, arguendo, the aesthetic of the other, or they may try to argue 
directly against the grid or energy aesthetic as such. However, as we explain earlier, 
and stress again below, each aesthetic comes with its own criteria of judgment, and 
therefore, we can never vindicate or rule out an aesthetic construction out of hand. 
The only way to argue against Fried’s grid-thinking is to seduce us to switch to another 
aesthetic. We explore such attempts shortly. 
A second aesthetic-to-aesthetic battle becomes visible when Fried is forced to 
explain why contract doctrine is so tightly connected to Kantian morality. In light of 
vast criticism, Fried admits that such a connection seems implausible,90 but does not 
                                                          
 88. Craswell, Expectation Damages, supra note 69, at 13; see also Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, supra note 12, 
at 523 (arguing that Fried’s “preoccupation with his theory of promising seems to prevent him from developing a 
coherent theory of the values that should play a role in selecting default rules.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, supra note 12, at 517-20. 
 90. Fried, Ambitions, supra note 39, at 17, Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 39, at 968; see also, Fried, Convergence, 
supra note 39. 
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retreat from the assertion that the promise principle is the "generating genius" of 
contract law,91 and continues to argue that, nevertheless, this is the type of answer 
that he wishes to pursue: 
The picture I have, then, is of philosophy proposing an elaborate structure of argu-
ments and considerations which descend from on high but stop some twenty feet 
above the ground. It is the peculiar task of law to complete this structure . . . so that it 
is seated firmly and concretely and shelters real human beings against the 
storms of passion and conflict . . . . The lofty philosophical edifice does not deter-
mine what the last twenty feet are, yet if the legal foundation is to support the whole, 
then ideals and values must constrain, limit, inform, and inspire the foundation but no 
more.92 
This is a remarkable passage, for it succeeds in momentarily, shifting the focus 
of the debate to “pictures” of law. This quote shows that Fried remains a grid-thinker 
even when he cannot support his conclusions with proper conceptual arguments. 
Even then, what is important is a picture of law within which the structure “is seated 
firmly and concretely,” in order to protect human beings against “the storms of pas-
sion and conflict.” In other words, the structure protects us from life itself: the ever-
changing, messy life that we found outside of the grid. As we noted above, one ac-
cepts an aesthetic not as a result of rational calculation, but because of an act of 
seduction; and here, we might find Fried’s most overt attempt to do just that. 
We can now begin to understand why an aesthetic point of view is a worthwhile 
pursuit. As a methodology, an aesthetic point of view explains a given theory’s ad-
vantages and weaknesses, in contrast to most categorizations that only partially ex-
plain some motivating forces behind the theories’ important insights. We see that 
Fried’s aesthetic construction performs a lot of the work for him, both when the 
theory seems natural and when it appears misguided. Realizing this, helps us to better 
understand Fried and makes it easier to explain his theory in a consistent manner. 
Neglecting his aesthetic perspective, on the other hand, may distort his point. 
III. RELIANCE 
A. Introduction 
Reliance-based theories deny the juridical significance of promise and hold that 
contractual obligation is based on a party’s reasonable reliance caused by the other 
party’s promise. According to this view, the purpose of giving legal force to a contract 
(or of awarding damages) is to undo the harm caused through reliance on a broken 
promise and not to give legal effect to people’s voluntary promises or expressions of 
will. 
                                                          
 91. Fried, Ambitions, supra note 39, at 18, Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 39, at 978. 
 92. Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 39, at 978 (emphasis in original). 
23
Zemach and Ben-Zvi: Contract Theory and the Limits of Reason
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
 190 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:167 
 
Reliance-based arguments were first introduced into modern theoretical think-
ing by Lon Fuller and William Perdue.93 Fuller and Perdue identified three principal 
justifications to awarding contract remedies: restitution, reliance, and expectation in-
terests.94 They ranked the interests in descending order, according to their strength, 
and asserted that the restitution and reliance interests are more worthy of protection 
than the expectation interest.95 Awarding the promisee the expected value means 
giving her an advantage not previously held. This, according to Fuller and Perdue, 
“seems on the face of things a queer kind of ‘compensation.’”96 
Though many others also contributed to reliance theory, Patrick Atiyah and 
Grant Gilmore are especially recognized as two theorists who further developed the 
idea of injurious reliance by devising a theory of contractual liability based solely on 
the idea of reliance.97 In so doing, they shifted attention from the purposes of reme-
dies to characteristic situations that are appropriate to be remedied.98 They further 
generalized Fuller and Perdue’s thesis and, in the process, dissolved contractual lia-
bility into tort.99 
As for the theory’s normative source, reliance arguments rely partially on no-
tions of corrective justice,100 which seek to maintain an equilibrium between mem-
bers of society by demanding that injustices inflicted by one person on another be 
amended.101 The reliance principle is also associated with John Stuart Mill’s “harm 
principle,” according to which, the state can only legitimately exercise power over an 
                                                          
 93. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 52; see Patrick Atiyah, Fuller and the Theory of Contract, in 
ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 73 (1986). On this article’s influence on further scholarship, see Robert Birmingham, Notes on 
the Reliance Interest, 60 WASH. L. REV. 217 (1985); Daniel Friedmann, The Performance Interest in Contract Damages, 111 L. 
Q. REV. 628 (1995); Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, supra note 11. There are, of course, others who contributed to 
the reliance theory in its formative years, such as Arthur L. Corbin. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and 
Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 679-80 (1984); cf. BAIRD, supra note 10, at 25-45. 
 94. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 53-54. In brief: the restitution interest focuses on the benefits 
obtained by the breaching party at the expense of the injured party, i.e., the breaching party’s unjust enrichment; the 
reliance interest focuses on the harm caused to the injured party in relying on the breaching party’s promise; and the 
expectation interest focuses on the injured party, but puts an emphasis on the party’s expected benefit from the 
bargain. 
 95. Id. at 56.  
 96. Id. at 53.  
 97. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); see also ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW, 
supra note 48. 
 98. See PATRICK ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1-39 (1979), for Atiyah’s classifica-
tion of benefit, reliance and promise as three grounds of liabilities. [hereinafter ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL]. 
 99. GILMORE, supra note 97, at 87-88; Atiyah, Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations, supra note 71, at 20-23. 
 100. See, e.g., Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 56. 
 101. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, book V. ch. 7 (J. E. C. Welldon, 1987). See also Ernest Weinrib, 
Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 TORONTO L.J. 349 (2014), for a general discussion. However, there are many objec-
tions to this strict view of corrective justice. In particular, it is argued that the idea of corrective justice is a structural 
concept which does not define, in and of itself, the baseline rights for its exercise. Thus, various theories, including 
autonomy-based theories, might equally justify their argument on the ground of corrective justice. See, e.g., SMITH, 
CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 10, at 147; Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 55, 62-70 (2003); Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, supra note 11, at 99, 121-22, 125, 127; Zamir, The 
Missing Interest, supra note 68, at 109; Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW, at 127-
38; Posner, After Three Decades, supra note 11, at 871; Friedmann, The Performance Interest in Contract Damages, supra note 
93, at 639; and see, generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1046-47 
(2001). 
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individual to prevent harm to others.102 The connection between harm and reliance, 
though debatable,103 is prima facie clear: Reliance theorists heavily emphasize the ele-
ment of undoing harm (according to a strict understanding of harm), rather than 
enforcing promises or increasing autonomy.. 
It should be noted that reliance-based theories are also usually considered in-
terpretive; they stress that contract law itself might be explained, or at least better 
understood, as a set of rules based upon the normative importance of reliance.104 
B. Aesthetics 
In this subsection, we defend the claim that in the writings of most reliance 
theorists, and specifically those discussed above, one can identify a dominant, shared 
aesthetic, which we earlier termed the energy aesthetic. Because we focus on several 
theorists instead of a single author (as we do in Part II), our interpretation relies on 
identifying several broad themes that are common to reliance scholarship. 
The first indication of an aesthetic shift in reliance theory is the fact that many 
such accounts deny the type of investigation that Fried and other theorists (e.g.,. will 
theorists) engage in. Thus, instead of arguing, e.g. that Fried is mistaken in identifying 
the operative component of contract in promise instead of in reliance, thinkers such 
as Fuller & Perdue reject the very idea of a sharply defined, stable object of inquiry. 
In their words, “[i]t is, as a matter of fact, clear that the things which the law of 
damages purport to “measure” and “determine”. . . are in considerable part its own 
creations, and that the process of “measuring” and “determining” them is really a 
part of the process of creating them.”105 Atiyah, too, discusses the fallacy of thinking 
that “a contract is a thing,”106 and objects to the view that a contract is “like a railway 
or a ship.”107 
                                                          
 102. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 23 (2nd ed. Ticknor & Fields, Boston, 1863). See also SMITH, CONTRACT 
THEORY, supra note 10, at 69; Bix, supra note 48, at 724-725; Atiyah, Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations, supra 
note 71, at 43-46 (discussing the close relationship between the harm principle and reliance theory).   
 103. Due to the flexibility of the definition of “harm,” see, e.g., Bix, supra note 48, at 727; see also ATIYAH, Contracts, 
Promises, and the Law of Obligations, supra note 71, at 45 (discussing Raz’s harm-based theory).  
 104. Thus, Fuller and Perdue argued that descriptively speaking, the reliance principle better explains contract 
remedies. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 418 (1937) 
[hereinafter Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest (Part 2)]. Craswell explored some of these claims in Against Fuller and 
Perdue, supra note 11, at 103-05. In the same vein, Atiyah and Gilmore have argued that the reliance principle provides 
a better framework through which contract law’s rules and practices can be described. See generally GILMORE, supra 
note 97, at 87-103; Patrick Atiyah, The Modern Role of Contract Law, in ATIYAH, ESSAYS, supra note 72, at 7-9 [hereinafter 
ATIYAH, The Modern Role of Contract Law]; ATIYAH, The Liberal Theory of Contract, in ATIYAH, ESSAYS, supra note 72, at 
123-24; Atiyah, Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations, supra note 71, at 19-28. 
 105. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 52. 
 106. ATIYAH, Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations, supra note 71, at 14. 
 107. ATIYAH, The Modern Role of Contract Law, supra note 104, at 1. Fried, on the other hand, highlights the static, 
universal, and quite palpable and unchanging, quality of the morality of promising, comparing it to a logical “mathe-
matical truth.” See Fried, 2007, supra note 39, at 2 (“Morality does not . . . describe attitudes, beliefs, or demands . . . 
, any more than mathematics . . . is about what people think, teach, or ordain about the domain of numbers and 
abstract relations. In both cases, there is a fact of the matter: the gratuitous infliction of pain is wrong; 2+2=4.”). Addi-
tionally, Fried often puts emphasis on the “timeless nature” of his theory. See FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, 2ND, 
supra note 39, at 2; Fried, Book Review, supra note 54, at 1864-65.  
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We submit that this tendency to reject contract as a stable object of inquiry is 
explained by the fact that under the energy aesthetic, which these theorists employ, 
the mind encounters law as a moving force—“an arrow pointed to the future”108—
and not as a static conceptual structure (recall The Judge example from the Introduc-
tion). When law is thought of this way, the focus of investigation turns to law’s in-
teraction with other social forces. The analysis presupposes an object of inquiry that 
is on the move—and the main purpose of intellectual investigation is to describe that 
movement. For instance, Fuller and Perdue argue that when we switch from correc-
tive to distributive justice, “[t]he law no longer seeks merely to heal a disturbed status 
quo, but to bring into being a new situation. It ceases to act defensively or restora-
tively, and assumes a more active role.”109 Notice how in order to even make sense 
of this claim, not to mention to consider it plausible, it is crucial to posit the energy 
aesthetic as background. Law is dynamic; as such, it is characterized by its actions. In 
a nutshell, contract doctrine is shaped as it is because “law and society have inter-
acted.”110 The crucial move that is motivating such assertions is the framing of law 
as something that can interact with the actual world, and the energy aesthetic supplies 
this presupposition. Thus, law is constantly characterized in active form as “seeking 
an end.”111 
A rigid conceptual analysis is thus ill-suited for reliance theory. The next logical 
step for energy thinkers—again, not a logical necessity, but an understandable tactic 
given their aesthetic commitments—is to introduce history to make sense of the the-
ory’s object of inquiry. After all, the history of an institution chronicles the different 
social forces that shaped it and were affected by it. And indeed, we find that reliance 
scholars usually argue along historical lines. In fact, they believe that not only does 
contract law react to other social forces; additionally, the manner we view the justifi-
cation for contract doctrine is also in constant motion. 
The standard historical meta-narrative advanced by reliance theorists is well-
known. It is commonly exemplified by notions, such as the rise and fall of freedom 
of contract, or the self-imposed, promissory paradigm of contractual obligation. 
There is no need, therefore, to repeat it at length here. Generally speaking, Atiyah 
describes the emergence of a contract theory that is organized around the idea of 
private autonomy in the nineteenth century, and its decline during the twentieth cen-
tury. Gilmore suggests an American version of the same tale, while famously an-
nouncing the death of contract (as a form of self-imposed, distinct, obligation).112 
We do not intend to make any substantive claims regarding the historical accuracy of 
                                                          
 108. Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, supra note 1, at 1070. 
 109. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 56. 
 110. Id. at 63; see also GILMORE, supra note 97, at 9, 95. 
 111. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 53. 
 112. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL, supra note 98, at 95; GILMORE, supra note 97. For a brief summary of Atiyah’s 
thesis, see SMITH, ATIYAH’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT, supra note 15, at 11-21; Fried, Book Review, 
supra note 54, at 1858-59. For a brief summary of Gilmore’s view, see Nathan Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract 
Law, 98 GEO. L. J. 77, 81-82 (2009).   
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these stories.113 Instead, we highlight two specific points with regard to these narra-
tives: 
(1) The historical account indicates a constant flux of movement vis-à-vis the 
theoretical justification of contract; contract law and theory are often described using 
dynamic terms: “transformation,”114 “rise” and “fall,”115 a moving “wheel” which 
ultimately “comes full circle,”116 an object that rose and then fell “from the high 
point which it had reached,”117 and even through personification of contract law’s 
development: “birth,” “growth,” “life,” and “death.”118 
(2) This history places heavy emphasis on contract law’s relationship with ex-
ternal social and intellectual forces,119 as well as on the effects of law.120 In other 
words, rather than being concerned with the “nature” of contractual obligation, and 
the structure of legal concepts, the historical narrative of contract theory tells a story 
that is focused on factual contingencies and empirical generalizations, both with re-
gard to contract law’s external influences, and its effects in the world. The historical 
framework taken by reliance theorists in order to establish their normative point is 
not incidental; rather, it reflects the aesthetic commitment upon which these theories 
are designed. In reliance theory, we are no longer looking for an ideal type, but rather 
for the movement of a force. 
C. The Upshot 
Understanding the underlying aesthetic sympathies of reliance theory helps ex-
plain several puzzling attributes of these theories. Additionally, it uncovers more aes-
thetic-to-aesthetic battles. 
1. A Better Understanding of Reliance Theory 
In this subsection, we highlight three elements of reliance theory that are better 
understood when viewed aesthetically. 
                                                          
 113. But see, e.g., Simpson’s discussion of Gilmore’s historical description (“a writing of historical twaddle, unin-
hibited by more or less total ignorance of his subject!” A. W. Brian Simpson: Calculating Promises: The Emergence of 
Modern American Contract Doctrine: By Roy Kreitner, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 221, 222 (2008)).   
 114. MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). 
 115. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL, supra note 98. 
 116. Id. at 716-79. 
 117. Id. 716.  
 118. GILMORE, supra note 97.  
 119. See generally ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL, supra note 98 (The rise and decline of the promissory concept is 
often associated with broader social developments, such as economic trends of free market and individualistic and 
liberal ideas of autonomy associated with the nineteenth century; the rise of the welfare state during the twentieth 
century, etc.). See, e.g., ROY KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN 
CONTRACT DOCTRINE (2006), for other cultural developments which influenced the transformation of contract law, 
 120. Reliance theorists often claim that liberal values conceal social coercion and resulted in a perpetuation of class 
inequality. See ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL, supra note 98, at 6-7. Thus, reliance theorists sought to establish a more 
communitarian, socialized, regime of contracts, which accords with the changing social and legal reality. See, e.g., 
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL, supra note 98, at 713-15, 778-79). 
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a. Conceptual Distinctions:  
The first point that might seem puzzling, if viewed outside of the aesthetic per-
spective, is that conceptual distinctions are not as important for reliance scholars as 
they are for promise theorists, working within the grid aesthetic. A scholar embracing 
the energy aesthetic ultimately sees only action. Nothing is stable in such a world. As 
Gilmore notes: “[t]he materials which, as lawyers, we deal with are, as we are all un-
happily aware, forever changing—they dissolve and recombine and metamorphose 
into their own opposites, all, it seems, without a moment’s notice.”121 Distinctions 
between various conceptual components in law are temporary and are always in a pro-
cess of decay (they have a history and a future). Consequently, their merits are only 
pragmatic: A distinction can be helpful as a rule of thumb, but in the end, it is not 
much more than a ladder that one discards once one has climbed over.122 
This point is seldom acknowledged in the literature, and indeed, the exact op-
posite is emphasized: Fuller and Perdue, for example, are considered the fathers of 
the threefold classification of the purposes of awarding contract damages, which 
“clarified the complex picture of contract remedies.”123 But a close reading of their 
article reveals that many of their distinctions were never meant to last. Some distinc-
tions eventually overlap, or subsume one another, and contrary to what most scholars 
think—this dissolution does not occur because of unfortunate analytical fallacies,124 
but by design, because of the aesthetic within which their discussion is situated. Put 
differently, rather than attempting to forcefully preserve a strict distinction between 
interests, Fuller and Perdue’s analysis does not take its own classification of interests 
too seriously. 
Interestingly, Fuller and Perdue themselves are happy to admit this. They do 
not feel that their analytical argument is threatened by the fact that restitution in many 
instances is actually a special case of reliance,125 or reliance on a promise is, in turn, 
typically included in restitution.126 Indeed—“Fuller and Perdue were willing to as-
sume that the restitution interest is identical to the reliance interest in most cases.”127 
                                                          
 121. GILMORE, supra note 97, at 3-4. 
 122. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS, § 6.54 (D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness 
trans., 1961).) (1974).  
 123. Eyal Zamir, The Missing Interest, supra note 68, at 61. 
 124. See, e.g., Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1755, 1767-68 
(1992) (discussing the multiple meanings attached to “the reliance interest.”); David W. Barnes, The Net Expectation 
Interest in Contract Damages, 48 EMORY L. J. 1137, 1146-157 (1999) (discussing and demonstrating the many overlaps 
between the different interests); Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68; Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest (Part 
2), supra note 104; Craswell, Against Fuller & Perdue, supra note 11, at 102, 136-54 (discusses the overlaps and similar-
ities between the different interests).   
 125. In typical cases where the gain involved in the restitution results from the injured-party’s loss through reliance, 
see Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 55. See also id. at 78 (defining “essential reliance” as including acts 
necessary to the perfection rights, such as a payments made by the promisee to the other party). 
 126. Id. at 54. Except from special cases where the breaching party is left with an unjust gain, which was not taken 
from the injured-party nor was not the result on reliance by the promisee.  
 127. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in Contract Damages, supra note 124, at 1155. 
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One may also notice that the distinctions between expectation and reliance—accord-
ing to Fuller and Perdue’s deliberate assumptions—are not entirely hermetic.128 
Moreover, Fuller and Perdue blurred the boundaries between the reliance principle 
and promissory notions in at least two important ways: 
(1) Fuller and Perdue actually promoted protection of bare expectations arising 
from a promise, though they re-casted them as an integral part of the reliance princi-
ple. In their view, the reliance principle must cover not only “losses caused” but also 
“gains prevented” due to lost opportunities inflicted by relying on a promise.129 Ab-
sent an aesthetic understanding of their theory, this concrete move—this broad def-
inition of reliance and the inclusion of recovery of gains from a lost (potential) con-
tract not entered—might be seen as an unexplained logical fallacy of the reliance 
theory,130 since it employs a promissory notion that removes partitions between re-
liance and promise.131 
(2) Another promissory notion evident in the reliance theory can be found in 
the “promissory constraints” that limit the extent of damages suffered by an injured 
party that will be repaired. Generally speaking, compensation for harms caused by a 
broken promise might, in some cases, exceed the value of the promise itself (e.g., in 
losing contracts). However, Fuller and Perdue argue that reliance damages awarded 
should not exceed the value of the promised performance.132 It follows that not every 
benefit received, nor all detriment reliance incurred, must be compensated for, rather 
only those that do not surpass the value of the promised performance. This means 
that an injured party does not have an independent right to be returned to her pre-
promised position without any regard to the particular contingencies and risk alloca-
tions included in the promise itself. But had the repair of damages been a central and 
independent goal of contract law, as argued by Fuller and Perdue, there would be no 
convincing reason to cap the reliance damages at the value of the promised perfor-
mance.133 
                                                          
 128. According to Fuller and Perdue’s view, the reliance interest also covers inherently “forgone opportunities”—
the profits that the injured party would have made had she entered into an alternative contract. If so, then the reliance 
interest also covers the injured party’s lost expectations according to Fuller and Perdue’s own definitions. See Fuller 
& Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 55-56, 60-61. See also id. at 78 (defining “essential reliance” as including 
within it acts of forgo in the opportunity to enter other profitable contracts). Secondly, in principle, at least in a typical 
case in which the contract produces a positive profit, the expectation measure inherently includes not only profits 
that the injured-party could have made, but also lost expenses and payments he made in reliance on the contract. See, 
e.g., Craswell, Against Fuller & Perdue, supra note 11, at 102. 
 129. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 55.  
 130. See Friedmann, The Performance Interest in Contract Damages, supra note 93, at 638 (arguing that Fuller and Per-
due’s theory of the recovery of lost opportunity of a potential contract is, in fact, the recovery of the very expectation 
interest arising from the actual contract though under the “guise of reliance.” If so, Friedmann argues correctly, this 
theory is flawed and based upon a circular reasoning).  
 131. See Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, supra note 124, at 1761-762 (arguing that Fuller and 
Perdue’s reliance ideal has actually transformed into a type of promissory model that in fact protects expectations). For 
a similar point regarding the case of opportunity costs, see FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, supra note 39, at 5.   
 132. See Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 79.  
 133. See Zamir, Contract Law & Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral, supra note 5, at 2084; see also Kelly, The Phantom 
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, supra note 124, at 1762-63.  
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Clearly, these two insights almost entirely blur the lines between reliance and a 
promise.134 Though these points, which are routinely described in the literature as 
conceptual fallacies, can be easily explained if one thinks of Fuller and Perdue’s aes-
thetic commitment. The energy aesthetic conditions reliance thinkers to give prece-
dence to the constant flux of shifting relations in the world, over rigid conceptual 
distinctions. It should be noted, that Fuller and Perdue are not the only reliance the-
orists to treat conceptual distinctions as rules of thumb. Gilmore, too, devotes much 
of his scholarship to proving that “the general theory of contract was never as neat 
and tidy and all-of-a-piece in the real world as it was to appear in casebook and treatise 
and Restatement.”135 Atiyah, as well, breaks down the “artificial” connection be-
tween contract and promise,136 as well as between contract as agreement,137 and blurs 
the boundaries between contractual and tortious liability:138 “I do not find the divi-
sions between the branches of the law to rest neatly upon fundamental theoretical 
. . . distinctions. The distinctions drawn between the branches of the law seem to me 
to be drawn for purposes of pedagogy and exposition, but precisely where the lines 
will be drawn often depends on historical accidents and traditions.”139 This ap-
proach—according to which distinctions may be important for pragmatic reasons, 
but are ultimately prone to change by the perpetual movement of law—is offered by 
all reliance theorists we discuss in this Article, and best descriptively explained by the 
energy aesthetic. 
Understanding the reliance approach’s tendency to blur distinctions in law is 
important because it implies that many criticisms aimed at these theorists—particu-
larly, for making distinctions that are not tenable or conceptually stable—are based 
on an erroneous assumption that the reliance approach is fundamentally committed 
to its conceptual categories and divisions. Similarly, and for the same reasons, it is 
incorrect to ascertain that the reliance approach cannot overcome the collapse of 
these distinctions. On the contrary, if these distinctions were universally correct (that 
is, that they were embedded into the structure of law), the reliance approach would 
have a problem, since it would mean that contract is “like a railway or a ship,” and 
that contrary to Gilmore’s claim, contracts are alive and well (how can something 
eternal die?). 
                                                          
 134. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, at 1764. 
 135. GILMORE, supra note 97, at 55. 
 136. ATIYAH, The Modern Role of Contract Law, supra note 104, at 4. 
 137. Id. 
 138. It should be noted that reliance theorists also reject the independent status of the law of restitution, see ATIYAH, 
Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations, supra note 71, at 47-48. 
 139. Id. at 48. See also Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest (Part 2), supra note 104, at 419 (arguing that breaking line of 
division between contract and other fields will be “a distinct service to legal thinking”). Cf. GILMORE, supra note 97, 
at 88 (“[t]here is really no longer any viable distinction between liability in contract and liability in tort.”). 
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b. Reliance and Expectation Damages in Fuller and Perdue 
The second seemingly false claim that aesthetics help put in context is Fuller 
and Perdue’s famous discussion on why the reliance interest is actually protected by 
expectation damages. Fuller and Perdue state, puzzlingly, that it is easier to measure 
the expectation interest than it is to measure the reliance interest. Therefore, and since 
the expectation value usually exceeds the value of reliance, the expectation interest 
serves as a yardstick for the reliance interest.140 Clearly, this assertion seems incorrect; 
contrary to the reliance measure of damages which is retrospective and based upon 
actual losses incurred, the expectation measure is prospective and, therefore, often 
demands hypothetical and speculative evaluations of the injured-party’s position had 
the promise been kept. Fuller and Perdue seem, therefore, committed to a false claim; 
indeed, this is how their claim is usually understood.141 
This, however, is a misunderstanding of the aesthetic ramifications of their the-
ory. One cannot explain Fuller and Perdue’s discussion of the proof and quantifica-
tion of reliance and expectation damages without mentioning that they dissolved the 
very distinction between these two interests (by including “gains prevented” due to 
lost opportunities in reliance).142 Therefore, when they argue that the reliance interest 
is harder to quantify than the expectation interest, they are not relying on a clear 
distinction between the two interests; instead, they claim that measuring one kind of 
expectation interest (stemming from the actual contract) is easier than measuring a 
different kind of the same interest (stemming from lost, potential, contracts not entered). 
While assuming that reliance damages are harder to measure than expectation dam-
ages, reliance (as a rigid category which is strictly separated from expectation) just 
drops out of the picture. Although this analysis does not make Fuller and Per-
due’s general argumentative move any more correct, it nevertheless explains why they 
endorsed this particular claim. 
c. Contract and Torts 
The final implication we explore concerns Atiyah and Gilmore’s claim that con-
tract law is slowly being absorbed into tort law.143 We do not wish to engage with 
this claim directly; arguments both for and against have been thoroughly discussed, 
rearticulated to account for objections, and contemplated ad nauseam. Instead, we 
stress that this is a paradigmatic claim for an energy-thinker. First, the claim is about 
movement; contract law is pictured as moving. Atiyah and Gilmore claim that the 
                                                          
 140. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 62. 
 141. See, e.g., Friedmann, The Performance Interest in Contract Damages, supra note 93, at 635-36; And indeed, according 
to a prevailing convention, it is actually the reliance measure of damages that is used as an approximation of the 
expectation interest. See, e.g., Zamir, Contract Law & Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral, supra note 5, at 2084.  
 142. As discussed above, according to Fuller and Perdue, real reliance entails far more than out of pocket expenses, 
and includes all the opportunities foregone when the contract was entered—including lost profits from other contracts 
not entered. This broad definition of reliance, as mentioned, in fact blurs the boundaries between the reliance and 
expectation interests. See our discussion at notes 178-9 and accompanying text.  
 143. See Part III.A. Gilmore, for instance, argued that contract law’s rules have experienced an ongoing “dissolv-
ing”. The growth of ideas such as quasi-contract, unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel as well as other devel-
opments, “illustrate the coming together of contract and tort.” See GILMORE, supra note 97, at 87-88. 
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destination of movement is tort law, but this view is outside of our examination 
(though we do take note of this issue shortly). We are far more interested in the 
notion that law moves, and that, consequentially, a proper account of contract law must 
involve a description of a vector, a starting point; an interim destination, and the 
history of the slow journey. It is not surprising, considering this, that both Atiyah and 
Gilmore’s principal method of analysis is historical, since history is the study of 
change in human affairs. In this regard, the force of their analysis rests on the as-
sumption that what we should look for is movement. 
Moreover, as to the specific destination of contract, an energy-thinker, when 
given the chance, would always look for (conceptually) destructive movement. Law 
operates to break down conceptual barriers since its flow cannot tolerate constant, 
unchanging differences. It is little wonder then, that according to Atiyah and Gilmore, 
contract is not only moving, but is being absorbed into another field, thus, eliminating 
two separate conceptual categories (Law & Economics literature takes this yet an-
other step further, as we demonstrate in section V Both of these claims regarding the 
disintegration of contract into tort are owed, in last part, to the energy aesthetic. But 
if we do not buy into this aesthetic, surely any account of contract law as moving 
would seem implausible. If, on the other hand, we accept the energy aesthetic (as we 
often do), then, as was the case with Fried, the most important intellectual step in the 
argument has already been accepted. The direction of contract law is of less im-
portance once we accept that it must be headed somewhere. 
2. More Aesthetic-to-Aesthetic Battles 
Not just reliance theory itself, but its relation to other schools of thought can 
be explained better via an aesthetic perspective. Take, for example, the following de-
bate. Fuller and Perdue famously argued that the will theory of contract—Fried’s 
predecessor —fails to logically entail any guideline with regard to remedies for 
breach. They state, for example, that “‘there is no necessary contradiction’ between 
the will theory and a rule which limits damages to the reliance interest,” and hold that 
a promissory theory does not logically entail any conclusive guideline with regard to 
the remedy.144 Eyal Zamir rejects this view. While Zamir does not claim that the will 
theory necessarily entails, in and of itself, expectation damages as the standard remedy 
for breach, he nonetheless points at Fuller and Perdue’s misconception when they 
assert that the will theory does not logically entail any guideline with regard to the 
remedy. Contrary to Fuller and Perdue, Zamir states that “there is a significant linkage 
between [the will] theory and remedies for breach of contract,” and that the will the-
ory entails “remedies that more clearly express the inherent moral virtue of keeping one’s 
                                                          
 144. See Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 58-59. See also Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules and the 
Philosophy of Promising, supra note 12, at 517-20 (argues that a promise based theory does not entail conclusive conse-
quences with regard to the remedy, and that almost every remedy might be consistent with a promissory regime).   
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promise.”145 We want to point out, that some pre-rational aesthetic sympathies, un-
derlie this seemingly rational debate between Fuller and Perdue and Zamir. 
Arguably, for Zamir, at least in this text, the legal space is constructed in a way 
that makes the will theory a separate, fundamental category of thought, which is in-
trinsically linked to other rigid sets of categories and (at least certain types of) reme-
dies. Fuller and Perdue, on the other hand, construct the legal space quite differently. 
Fuller and Perdue describe law—more specifically, the will theory—in energy-think-
ing terms, as a force which flows toward infinite directions (in our case: towards pro-
tecting reliance). While Fuller and Perdue presuppose an aesthetic under which law 
(and, consequently, contract) is chiefly described by movement, Zamir’s view (in this 
case) reflects grid-thinking. He imagines the realm in which his argument takes place, 
divides law into intellectual categories (“will theory,” “remedies,” etc.), and then de-
duces from the “inherent moral virtue” of the rubric “will” to achieve certain devia-
tions from it. In so doing, Zamir is engaging in the type of activity that an energy-
thinker is simply conditioned to ignore. And the opposite is true as well, of course. 
When Zamir argues that contrary to Fuller and Perdue, it is necessary to logically 
deduce other particular remedies from the will theory, both sides of the argument are 
using aesthetically-charged arguments to such a degree that the disagreement between 
them can no longer be solved by rational means. Fuller and Perdue’s view on law 
leaves no room for the sort of activity that their opponents are interested in. 
Why is this so? Fuller and Perdue’s strongest objection to the rigid connection 
between the will theory and remedies is aesthetic, not substantive. Their aim is to 
stop us from thinking about the object of inquiry (i.e. contract) as something that is 
imbued with inherent essence, and instead, concentrate solely on the manner in which 
we utilize contracts to attain certain ends. This can only be because in their eyes, to 
describe the law is to describe action. Therefore, if we accept the energy aesthetic, we 
can agree that contracts are connected to expressions of will without inferring to what 
contracts do while they are on the move. For Zamir, on the other hand, there is value 
in the type of project that tries to map legal remedies vis-à-vis conceptual entities. 
Thus, we get an aesthetic-to-aesthetic battle: the conflicting arguments are, in fact, 
different claims about different kinds of objects, and they obey different norms of 
plausibility and persuasion. The important step in the argument is that neither one of 
the parties discusses explicitly the framing of the intellectual project in a manner that 
guarantees that only certain kinds of results could be legitimately generated. Once this 
step is over, it is much easier to discredit the other side’s type of response. 
                                                          
 145. See Zamir, The Missing Interest, supra note 68, at 105. In a similar vein, see Friedmann, The Performance Interest in 
Contract Damages, supra note 93  , at 637 (asserting that the basis of the right entails necessary conclusions with regard 
to the remedy which should be, if accepting the will theory, specific performance). 
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IV. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
A. Introduction 
The economic literature on contract is extensive, and we only intend to discuss 
some of the basic premises and features underlying economic theories of contract 
law.146 Economic efficiency is a utilitarian theory; it views law in general,147 and con-
tract law in particular, as an instrument for increasing aggregate human welfare148 
(usually measured by the satisfaction of individual preferences).149 Economic theo-
rizing about contract might be normative, descriptive, or interpretative.150 Normative 
economic analysis strives to identify and recommend the most efficient doctrinal 
rule,151 while descriptive economic theories hold that existing contract doctrine is 
best seen as serving the goal of maximizing welfare.152 An interpretive economic 
theory, such as the ones we discuss below, combines normative and descriptive ele-
ments. 
Most economic theories believe that while, in principle, efficiency goals could 
have been promoted through a direct enforcing of actions or rules which are efficient 
in and of themselves,153 contract law contains a set of incentives for future contract-
ing parties.154 
                                                          
 146. For an extensive discussion on economic theories, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Principles of Fairness 
Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 977-99 (2001); EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS AND 
MORALITY 11-40 (2010). For discussions on economic theories of contract law, see, e.g., RICHARD CRASWELL, Contract 
Law: General Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS VOLUME III (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 2000); Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS VOLUME I 3-128 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW Ch. 4 (8th ed. 2011); ERIC POSNER, Contract Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY ch.Ch. 9 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005); 
Posner, After Three Decades, supra note 11; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CONTRACT LAW (1979).  
 147. Economic theory of contract law is actually a particular instantiation of a more general economic theory of 
law which applies to many other legal areas. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW (2004); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2004); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS 
ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2012), A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(3d ed. 2003). 
 148. While efficiency is perceived as a proxy for human welfare. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Principles of Fairness 
Versus Welfare, supra note 146, at 961. 
 149. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8. J. LEGAL. STUD. 103, 119 (1979), for 
a discussion in contrast to the utilitarian concept of subjective happiness.  
 150. See Oman, Failure of Economic Interpretations, supra note 11, at 837-38.  
 151. See, e.g., Posner, After Three Decades, supra note 11, at 834.  
 152. KRONMAN & POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 146, at 5; see POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 146. For a brief discussion on descriptive economic theories, see Craswell, In that Case, 
supra note 11, at 904-07. For a philosophical defense on explanatory economic theories, see Jody S. Kraus, Transparency 
and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287 
(2007).   
 153. Some examples might be found in SMITH, supra note 10, at 114; and in Kaplow & Shavell, Principles of Fairness 
Versus Welfare, supra note 146, at 1103.   
 154. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 115; BIX, supra note 10, at 135; Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing 
Promises, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 10, at 26; Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, supra note 11, 
at 1071; Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-29 (1985); 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 692-725 
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B. Aesthetics 
We argue that an aesthetic inquiry into economic theories of contract reveals 
four major insights: (a) economic efficiency is based on energy aesthetics; (b) in this 
respect, economic efficiency is aesthetically related to reliance theories of contract. 
More specifically, the economic approach is an aesthetic radicalization of reliance theory; 
(c) because of this, some of the attributes of reliance theory come to be radicalized 
as well. Our main example is that economic theories tend to dissolve all, or almost all 
conceptual distinctions in law, to the point that the object of inquiry disappears; (d) 
the economic approach also demonstrates that taking an aesthetic to its endpoint 
leads to its collapse. We discuss assertions (a)-(b) in this subsection and devote sub-
section V.C to demonstrate claims (c)-(d). 
The first point we stress is that most economic theories represent energy think-
ing.155 In fact, our general contention that aesthetic commitments underlie many sub-
stantive insights is most evident here, since law and economics scholarship is very 
explicit about the way it constructs its object of analysis. Economic analysis explains 
legal objects—contracts, torts, international treaties etc.—in terms of their influence 
on maximizing efficiency, and more specifically, by the incentives they create for in-
dividuals. Applied to contract law, this means that contract is a vehicle for maximizing 
individual and social gains. The energy aesthetic is capable of making the economic 
theory of contract seem plausible, even natural or organic. Here, too, as in reliance 
or promise theories, once we accept the dominant aesthetic notion, the rest of theory 
just seems to follow naturally. 
Thus, Richard Posner informs us that “economics is the deep structure of the 
common law.”156 And how can it not be? If law itself is but a force, the amalgamation 
of many individual’s choices about how society should be regulated, how can it not 
be best described by the scientific method that captures all “rational choice in the 
world?”157 In a sense, it is understandable why economic theories (however by now 
dominated by pure normative inclinations) have first emerged through a descriptive 
viewpoint.158 Just as reliance theorists attempted to descriptively show that contract 
law is actually moving toward reliance and fairness, Posner pointed to the fact that 
existing law actually moves as an efficiency maximization force.159 It was only later, 
                                                          
(1986); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE 
L.J. 87 (1989). Many examples may be found in Posner, After Three Decades, supra note 11.  
 155. Perhaps some theories related to economic efficiency (though not the ones we discuss here) could be best 
described as supported by the grid aesthetic. Arguably, such an approach is reflected in the “new formalism” or 
“instrumental formalism” economic approaches to contract interpretation. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 11; 
Kreitner, supra note 15, at 436-38 (“Local Instrumental Formalism”). In these cases, the general normative theory is 
confined by a narrow formalist set of rules which govern the question of how contract law can support economic 
efficiency. Law then ceases to be pictured as a force on the move and starts to appear as a kind of rigid grid which 
includes within it strict distinctions and categories by which (and only by which) its substantive goal is to be reached.   
 156. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 249 (7th ed. 2007). 
 157. Id. at 3. 
 158. See, e.g., Craswell, In that Case, supra note 11, at 904 (describing the early days of law and economics as ones in 
which much attention was given to descriptive analysis of law).   
 159. See RICHARD POSNER, supra note 21. See also Oman, Failure of Economic Interpretations, supra note 11, at 837.  
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after this aesthetic was already deeply rooted within legal thinking that the descriptive 
economic analysis fell out of favor and was replaced by fully normative analysis—
which presupposed the same structure of thought.160 
Recall that the reliance theorists we discuss above also rely on a similar aesthetic 
understanding; contract law was defined in terms of how it actually affects the parties 
to the contract. In this respect, economic scholarship simply takes this type of rea-
soning one step further: if law—and, derivatively, contract—is only defined in terms 
of what it does, why not define law in terms of every quantitative change it brings 
about? Why settle only for the welfare of the concrete parties to the contract them-
selves and not, for instance, on overall human welfare? Thus, thinking the reliance 
theory’s presuppositions through leads to something like the economic approach. 
This point is crucial; most current analyses describe reliance and promissory 
theories as belonging to the same camp.161 However, our analysis reorganizes the 
standard divisions of camps, placing reliance and efficiency in the same (aesthetic) group. 
Of course, one might also find some substantive similarities between these theories; 
arguably, Fuller and Perdue may be seen as predicting some economic insights of 
their own.162 Our aesthetic examination reveals that these insights are not a negligible 
postscript to their central reliance thesis, but rather a possible echo of their deepest 
aesthetic commitment—one that is also shared by efficiency theories. 
In particular, the economic theory of contract is the result of taking the energy 
aesthetic to its logical endpoint.163 As Duncan Kennedy notes, something similar 
happened with the American Realist movement and CLS: Once the idea that clear-
cut rules do not constrain adjudication established itself in the minds of legal aca-
demics, it was an easy next step to question whether policy considerations, to which 
early Realists alluded to next, are any different.164 Thus, when we accept that law is 
not inert, but is rather better described as a force in motion, we are forced to wonder 
why any static constraining apparatus—whether a rule set forth by the legislator, or a 
policy determination made by the public—could hold it in check. The same phenom-
enon, we argue, affects contract theory: once the energy aesthetic became prominent 
via reliance theories (originally, we argue, with regard to a substantive conception of 
corrective justice), the floodgates opened, and energy-thinking spread, thus, resulting 
                                                          
 160. See Craswell, In that Case, supra note 11, at 904, 906-07.   
 161. Both reliance and promissory theories are, for example, “rights-based” theories. See supra Introduction. See 
also Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, supra note 71, at 1488. As to promissory and efficiency theories, despite 
the fundamental divergences between them, they overlap in many ways; specifically, they converge in many central 
points—both in some of their basic premises, and in their recommendations for the substantive content of contract 
law. See, e.g., Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, supra note 15, at 687; Fried, Thirty Years On, supra note 39, at 964-65, 
Fried, Ambitions, supra note 39, at 22-24.  
 162. They recognized the instrumental importance of enforcing promises, and asserted that the remedy of expec-
tation damages might be explained both on the ground it influences the parties’ incentives (in their words: “encour-
agements”), and because it facilitates business agreements which in turn support economic activity. See Fuller & 
Perdue, Reliance Interest, supra note 68, at 61-62.  
 163. Though there are different ways of doing this. Other possible results include cultural theories of contract, 
feminist jurisprudence and other theories, which limitations of space prevent us from discussing seriously here.  
 164. See KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 24, at 113, 148. 
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in one of the most paradigmatic energy theories—economics. If this is correct, it 
means that the economic theory of contract is not just a third theory, but an aestheti-
cally radical version of one of the first two. 
C. The Upshot 
Turning to our next point—the implications of energy-thinking on conceptual 
distinctions—we examine some paradigmatic characteristics of economic literature 
on contract. First, consider this highly illuminating comment by Shavell: 
Is it not of interest to every legal analyst to determine how legal rules affect behavior 
and then to evaluate the rules with reference to some criterion of the social good? The 
answer would seem to be “yes,” and thus in this general sense, one cannot distinguish 
economic analysis from other analysis of law.165 
Here we see that not only is law economic in nature (recall Richard Posner’s 
assertion that economic logic is “the deep structure of the common law,”) but in fact, 
any intellectual legal inquiry is, in the end, reducible to economics.166 Indeed, if we 
condition ourselves to only seek movement and force, we naturally find a lot of what 
we are looking for. 
Surely, some distinctions remain cherished in the literature on law and econom-
ics (more on that below). Nevertheless, we can see that the conceptual borders that 
seem to underlie the very coherence of speaking about law as an individualized unit 
start to dissolve. We have already witnessed that there is no specific, differentiated 
economic point of view on the law; any inquiry into law is, in the end, economic in 
nature. And, additionally, economists claim that law itself represents economic logic. 
Taking these two suggestions together implies a certain redundancy—even a double 
redundancy—in the term “law and economics.” On the one hand, when we study 
law, we are always actually studying economics; on the other hand, there is nothing 
unique in applying an economic point of view to law, since any inquiry is in the end 
economic. From this point of view, law and economics is, actually, just general intel-
lectual inquiry—it is neither uniquely economic nor legal. Schlag calls this the “de-
differentiation problem.”167 It occurs when certain fields of study cannot analytically 
explain the difference between their methodology and the object they are studying.168 
He also suggested that it applies to economic analysis of law.169 Our analysis confirms 
this suspicion,170 but more importantly, explains that its origins lie in aesthetic pre-
suppositions. 
An important implication of this type of energy-thinking is that it too finds that 
contract law is merging into a different area of law. This time, though, it is not just 
                                                          
 165. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 147, at 4. 
 166. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 147, at 249. 
 167. Pierre Schlag, The De-Differentiation Problem, 41 CONT. PHIL. REV. 35 (2009). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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tort law; instead, contract law is woven into a single, unified tissue called “law.” One 
can, therefore, understand contract doctrine in any number of ways: for example, as 
tort problems, or as problems concerning property rights.171 The reason that this 
counterintuitive idea seems plausible to economic scholars is, perhaps, related to sub-
stantive methodological commitments, though we believe it is primarily connected to 
the energy aesthetic.172 These theorists view law, as a whole, as a moving force that 
influences human behavior through incentives. “Contract” is just another intellectual 
construct through which the law accomplishes this, but economic theories have no 
reason to be particularly faithful to this construct as opposed to another, since tort, 
or property rights for that matter, are all just symbols for doing the same thing. 
Through contracts, torts, and property rights law creates incentives and seeks to 
shape individual behavior. Hence, the movement of law—toward efficiency, maxim-
izing social welfare, or any other economic goal—is the focal point of the theory; the 
specific vehicle through which it moves is nothing more than a casual instrument. 
A contract is, therefore, exactly like a tort, or a property right, or any other legal 
term for that matter. They are fictions through which social benefit is maximized 
(successful or not, only economists know). The dissolvent that reliance thinkers have 
concocted works to maximum effect here. Contract law is not absorbed into torts; it 
is just absorbed. To be sure, economic-thinkers deeply care about some conceptual 
distinctions, but these are mostly economic in nature (supply/demand, rational/irra-
tional players, ex post/ex ante, etc.) instead of legal (contract/tort, etc.). The reason is, 
again, that only economics is real when energy aesthetic is employed in this way. Only 
objects that can be measured in the way efficiency theories measure the world are 
deemed substantial; law is just another quantified material. 
This leads us, finally, to touch on an interesting phenomenon that has not yet 
been addressed in our discussion. Commonly put, aesthetics are only useful when not 
closely examined—that is, when the logical implications of the picture they imply are 
not meticulously pursued. Figuratively speaking, we may say that just like with one’s 
heroes, it is best to keep an appropriate distance from one’s aesthetic; too far, and 
the excitement eventually wears off; too close, and the illusion becomes clear for what 
it is. The reason for this is that aesthetic activity involves giving form to (and in the 
process, constructing) an intellectual object for purposes of inquiry. This type of ac-
tion has something artificial about it: as we noted earlier, law is not really a rigid grid, 
nor is it a moving social force; we choose to see it as such since it allows us to come 
in contact with it.173 We encounter many processes, people, institutions, and ideas 
that comprise law, and to make sense of them, we situate ourselves somewhere and 
“[decree] from our corner that perspectives are permitted only from this corner,” as 
Nietzsche put it.174 And this process of aesthetic construction involves some degree 
                                                          
 171. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 147,, at 250. 
 172. Jody Kraus discusses the tendency of economic theories to unify diverse areas of law under the same principle 
of efficiency, defining this tendency as a “methodological commitment.” See Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, supra 
note 15, at 699-701. 
 173. Schlag, Law and Phrenology, supra note 30, at 907. 
 174. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 336 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974). 
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of falsification, in the sense that we necessarily have to focus on something and in the 
process treat other phenomena which we encounter as unimportant. But when we 
insist on seeing the world solely through the eyes of our aesthetic, the world eventu-
ally resists; some of the data we ignored comes back to haunt us, and we are con-
stantly reminded that we have chosen to forget some things that perhaps should not 
have been forgotten. 
This is what happened to Langdellian formalism and to Fried’s theory of con-
tract. In both cases, critics claimed that when we take the theory most seriously, we 
find out that it is not truly operative.175 For instance, we cannot really make the log-
ical, deductive transition from one point in Fried’s grid to the next, since that involves 
“forgetting” a lot of information, which, if included, would overwhelm the aes-
thetic.176 We believe that the economic approach to contract is experiencing just this 
sort of crisis, and for the same reasons. 
The problem, in a nutshell, is that energy is everywhere; the world is ever-chang-
ing in countless ways. Consequently, we cannot really make the idea of energy oper-
ative. The energy aesthetic demands that we identify every meaningful (that is, social-
welfare altering) way in which law influences society, and vice-versa, through con-
tract. Otherwise, we cannot fully capture what contract is (it would be similar to of-
fering a conceptual understanding of contract with several necessary conditions miss-
ing). But for this project, the project of articulating exactly how different contractual 
regimes affect people in the world, economics is just not suited, since economic mod-
els cannot actually measure many important factors that influence our lives (the way 
we are structured by ideology and society comes to mind).177 And it is interesting that 
this challenge to economic theory comes from within the practice itself. 
For example, consider Eric Posner’s assertion that the economic approach pro-
vides indeterminate policy recommendations about contract doctrine, since “[the de-
terminate] models omit important variables, but including these variables makes them 
indeterminate, or, in some cases, unrealistic.”178 This comment, and others like it,179 
can only be the result of taking economic theory too seriously, and trying hard to 
actually make it work. When these attempts fail—when, for instance, the doctrine 
fails to align all sorts of incentives perfectly—they reveal not a methodological prob-
lem with the economic analysis, but an aesthetic problem. We cannot ensure that we 
have measured everything, and, more alarmingly, we do not know what constitutes 
                                                          
 175. Baird describes this point neatly with regard to Langdell, by stating that: “There were principles in the great 
beyond that were fixed and immutable. A court sitting on Mars would apply the same principles. We should not be 
surprised that such fantasies created trouble.” See, BAIRD, supra note 10, at 150. 
 176. See e.g, supra Part II, notes 67, 90, 106; Part III. note 151. 
 177. Pierre Schlag, Four Conceptualizations of the Relations of Law to Economics (Tribulations of a Positivist Social Science), 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2357, at 2357 (2012). This is not to imply that other methods are more suited for this task.  
 178. Posner, After Three Decades, supra note 11, at 834. See also POSNER, supra note 10, at 223-32. 
 179. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 SAN. D. L. REV. 1135 (2003) (opin-
ing that different economic models are based upon different variables, therefore often establish different conclusions. 
An attempt to combine all economic considerations is impossible); see also, with regard to contract remedies, 
POLINSKY, supra note 147, at 69; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 147, at 331; Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach 
of Contract, 11 Bell J. Econ. 466 (1980). 
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an object worth measuring until we impose order—but that order will always keep 
certain things out. And yet, when we measure only some things, and not others, we 
do not have an adequate understanding of the world even by our own standards. A 
solution is not easily forthcoming; as we note earlier, the wise scholar avoids trouble 
in the first place by never pursuing her aesthetic to the fullest degree.180 
V. PLURALISM 
A. Introduction 
We end our discussion with a brief tour of one of the field’s most intriguing 
notions —the pluralist approach to contract. Pluralist conceptions are based on the 
idea that a single principle cannot justify or describe the entire realm of contract 
law.181 Drawing on the notion that each theory contains genuine and valuable in-
sights, but none is capable of explaining or justifying the complete normative 
sphere,182 pluralists have argued against the exclusiveness of a single approach, sug-
gesting instead a synthesis of many principles.183 
In this Article, we focus on unprincipled pluralism, which holds that there is no 
meta-principle or overarching theory that determines a-priori which of the principles 
is superior when justifications collide.184 This version of pluralism certainly does not 
exhaust the pluralist discussion. For instance, some argue for a more conclusive way 
of reconciling or balancing multiple values.185 Others have sought to construct an 
                                                          
 180. Which creates other problems, of course. 
 181. This position is fueled in part by the absence of a compelling, internally-consistent theory which entails clear 
doctrinal results. See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, supra note 13, at 223-40; SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 48, 
at 28; BIX, supra note 10, at 132-36; HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 14; Oman, Unity and 
Pluralism in Contract Law, supra note 71, at 1498-499. Another reason for endorsing pluralism is that contract law is 
perceived as too complex to be captured by any specific theory. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces, Unintelligent Design in Contract, 
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 505 (2008); Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103, at 123 
(1988); HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW supra note 14, at 273; Peter A. Alces, The Moral Impossibility of 
Contract, supra note 13, at 1661; SMITH, supra note 10, at 159. See also BIX, supra note 10, at 119, 126, 147, 152-53, 155, 
161-62.  
 182. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, supra note 181, at 103-04, 133; see also HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS 
OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 14, at 2, 4, 6; BIX, supra note 10, at 160.  
 183. Both from a descriptive and a normative standpoint. Thus pluralism, at least in some variants of it, is also an 
interpretive theory—it seeks both to justify and explain contract law (or certain parts of it). See SMITH, supra note 10, 
at 158-60; See also SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 48, at 28; Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, supra note 13, at 240-44; 
Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (1997); BIX, 
supra note 10, at 147-62; HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 14, at 267-73.  
 184. Such theories are commonly labeled as ‘ad hoc’ mixture of normative theories. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 10, 
at 158–59. For examples of such theories, see Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, supra note 181, at 104 
(argues that the very question of the relative weight of conflicting principles is "unanswerable" as well as "unim-
portant."); HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 14, at 2, 4, 268 (argues against a rigid theoretical 
ordering and excessive abstraction), Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 915 
(2012) (offers a pluralist conception that lacks a core or an overarching principle for deciding cases). For further 
discussion see infra notes 191-200 and the accompanied text. 
 185. See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, supra note 13, at 240-44 (discussing his “multi-valued” theory). For 
criticism on this approach, see e.g. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 11, at 543, n.2. For another attempt to balance, in 
some way, multiple values, see BIX, supra note 10, at 136, 148.  
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even clearer principled form of pluralism.186 Disregarding the question whether such 
models are in the end, pluralistic at all, our primary concern here is with the unprin-
cipled variant of pluralism.187 We choose to only focus on this type of pluralism be-
cause, like Charles Fried’s or Fuller and Perdue’s theories, it is a “classic” in the sense 
that it is the standard for other approaches. In addition, it serves as a good example 
for a theory that relies on a specific aesthetic structure. We do not deny, of course, 
that an aesthetic analysis of other, more principled, pluralistic theories can be highly 
illuminating and may reach different results than those we defend here.188 
B. Aesthetics 
Pluralism itself (as opposed to any specific pluralist mixture of justifications) is 
usually presented as an alternative to, or a critique of, theoretical unification in gen-
eral, and not as a response to any specific unitary contract theory. For example, both 
Hillman and Bix introduce pluralism to suggest that all unitary theories are partially 
correct. However, our analysis reveals that pluralism too rests on a single (one is 
tempted to say unitary) aesthetic. In other words, the pluralist project is informed by 
a particular aesthetic vision, which in this case, differs from the ones we have already 
addressed. This aesthetic—the dissociative aesthetic—is responsible for pluralism’s 
unique characteristics; it animates the approach’s strengths, which are hard to deny, 
but also its weaknesses. In this respect, pluralism is on equal terms with other first-
order contract theories in the sense it is presented in a manner that presupposes a 
single aesthetic.189 
Here, then, is an example of dissociative thinking: 
Example IV: The Vexed Law Student 
During your first year contracts class, your professor asks you to describe the holding 
in a particular case. You read the case beforehand and found that it was extremely well 
                                                          
 186. Either by integrating or reconciling theories, or by dividing contract (or contract law) into types. See, e.g., 
Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, supra note 184, at 919-21 (demonstrating divisions by contracting 
parties; situations; contract law’s categorizations). For attempts to integrate, balance or reconcile principles in varied 
ways, see Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 
420, 422 (2001) (suggesting two models of “vertical integration”); Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, supra 
note 71, at 1499-506 (using lexical ordering); Daniel Farber, Economic Efficiency and The Ex Ante Perspective, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt 
eds., 2000) (offering a foundational and derivative model); Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229 
(1998) (reconciling efficiency and paternalism); Hanoch Dagan Autonomy, Pluralism and Contract Law Theory, 76 L. & 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 19 (2013) (arguing that autonomy-based approach to contract should be attentive to 
diverse ideals and principles); Jody S. Kraus Legal Theory and Contract Law: Groundwork for the Reconciliation of Autonomy 
and Efficiency, 1 SOC. POL. & L. PHIL. 385 (2002) (offering a model of “horizontal independence” for reconciling 
theories). See generally ZAMIR & MEDINA LAW, ECONOMICS AND MORALITY, supra note 15 at Ch. 4 (integrating 
economic analysis with deontological commitments).   
 187. Arguably, some of the suggested models of reconciling theories are not purely pluralistic either because they 
dim, if not wholly nullify, conflicts between theories (see Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, supra note 
184, at 918-19, n.12), or because theories that divide contract into types or situations are, in a sense, unitary, because 
they provide a singular justificatory principle to each contingency. 
 188. This topic deserves a separate inquiry. We only note, tentatively, that some pluralist theories contain a rigid 
internal ordering within fixed categorizations, and therefore might reflect grid tendencies (see, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, On 
Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in the General Theory of Contract, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1 (2005)).   
 189. Although we again want to stress that this is not necessary—any theory could, potentially, be presented using 
different aesthetics. Some aesthetics combine more naturally with specific theories. 
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justified, given past decision in similar situations, and you explain why. Your law pro-
fessor then asks you to explain why the holding is incorrect and should be reversed. 
The question catches you off-guard, and you freeze—you intuitively thought that the 
case was rightly decided and can’t find any rationales to support a reverse decision. 
Nevertheless you give it your best shot. In order to find something to say you try to 
broaden your point of view and think of more than the precedents. In the quick mo-
ment you take for reflection, any remotely plausible response is possible. You quickly 
reorganize and tell your professor that legal precedent notwithstanding, the ruling ig-
nores some legal principles that are deeply embedded into contract law. In addition, 
you recall a remotely analogous case from another field that featured a different logic. 
You mention the case and argue that is relevant to this one because it features similar 
policy considerations. 
As Pierre Schlag notes, lawyers sometimes experience a moment in which their 
intellect suspends belief in all conceptualizations of law. This is usually the moment 
just before drafting a court brief or prior to writing a judicial decision. At that mo-
ment, many different options appear, and we refuse to give law a particular structure 
in any way whatsoever. The result is that law has no predisposed form. Law may be a series 
of clear-cut authoritative rules, if that suits the client’s interests, but it may also be a 
social force that responds to ideological and economic pressures. And it might, of 
course, be something else entirely. 
At this point, the jurist has yet to determine how to engage with—how to con-
struct —law. Making a final decision and advancing a legal argument means leaving 
the dissociative aesthetic, which allows the presentation of multiple options and mak-
ing a choice. The dissociative moment is highly creative, and it facilitates an important 
process that many who practice law go through (often very quickly) before they 
choose how to advance a substantive legal claim. As Schlag notes, “[t]here is no sum 
to be added up here: each aspect of law (law as conceptual system, law as behavior, 
law as coercive apparatus) is already conjoined with the others.”190 However, we can-
not examine law through the dissociative aesthetic for long periods of time—it is 
mostly a destructive force that has to be first discarded in order to actually build 
something (a legal holding, a chapter in a book, etc.). Thinking of law in a dissociative 
manner allows us to begin with a “clean slate” on which we proceed to construct our 
desired projects. 
The dissociative aesthetic is an intellectual frontier, and like other frontiers, it is 
full of potential and danger. The remainder of this subsection focuses on the manner 
this aesthetic actually connects to and supports pluralism in contract theory. Part V.C 
then discusses how aesthetic dissociation triggers some of the more common attacks 
on pluralism. 
Our main example of the relationship between pluralism and aesthetic dissoci-
ation is the pluralists’ main thesis regarding contract doctrine. While pluralists offer 
different accounts of the mix of justifications for contract, many rely on the same 
                                                          
 190. Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, supra note 1, at 1096. 
42
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 52 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss2/18
 2017] CONTRACT THEORY AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 209 
 
basic normative technique: they explain how different justifications combine to clar-
ify and justify contract doctrine on a case-by-case basis. For example, Hillman argues 
that “theorists should address how to utilize each principle in particular contexts,”191 
and Kreitner offers a pluralist conception that has no core.192. According to Kreitner, 
"there is no one idea that encapsulates the sine qua non of contract, no nodal point 
from which all the instantiations of the institution of contract flow: not autonomy; 
not consent; not promise; not a community of mutual respectful recognition; not 
efficiency; not the transfer of proprietary right; not reliance (tired yet? I could go 
on)".193 In his view, contract "serves as an infrastructure that provides a means to 
carry out a range of collaborative projects"194., and pluralistic theory of contract 
should not necessarily provide a general metric for deciding concrete cases but rather 
to provide a "language for mediating between normative commitments and the set-
tings in which we try to realize those commitments” 195. Zamir maintains (regarding 
specific legislation) that, 
No normative theory, in and of itself, can provide full explanation or justification for 
the entire Law, or even to any of its provisions . . . Indeed, there are tensions and even 
contradictions among the various theories, their premises, and their implications . . . 
However . . . one should take all theories into account when interpreting the Law.196 
Finally, even Melvin Eisenberg, who sought a more ordered view, conceded 
that “when social propositions conflict the Legislator must exercise good judgment 
concerning the weight and role to be given to each proposition in the issue at 
hand . . . .”197 
Pluralists believe, then, that pluralism provides many possible justifications and 
that to “understand” any specific contract doctrine is to explain how the different 
rationales actually support the doctrine. For instance, one rule may be justified by the 
reliance principles, and another by both economic efficiency and morality of promise-
keeping. Pluralists’ basic tenet is that contract law is complex and should not, and 
cannot, be explained by only one justification. 
To demonstrate this view, consider a pluralist approach to §90 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, which states that reliance upon a promise should be 
reasonable “as justice requires.”198 As Leon Trakman states, a pluralist should seek 
                                                          
 191. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 14, at 269. As mentioned, Hillman explicitly argues 
against the attempt to establish some pre-determined balance of conflicting principles. See supra note 184.  
 192. Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, supra note 184, at 923, 926. 
 193. Id. at 923. 
 194. Id. at 924. 
 195. Id. at 923. 
 196. See Eyal Zamir, Theoretical Foundations of the Sale Law (Housing), 30 MISHPATIM 495, 512 (2000) [Hebrew]. In 
other place, Zamir explicitly declines the need for a balancing overarching theory; see Zamir, Contract Law and Theory: 
Three Views of the Cathedral, supra note 5, at 2087, n.23.  
 197. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, supra note 13, at 244; see infra Part V.A (discussing Eisenberg’s multi-valued 
theory).  
 198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §90. 
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to examine the different moral dimension of this provision before making any deter-
mination in a specific case.199 In particular, a pluralist is burdened with identifying, 
weighing, ranking and comparing different moral values in order to determine 
whether enforcing a promises is reasonable, "as justice requires."200 We are not in-
terested in asking what decisions such a procedure would generate, but rather what 
sort of image of law one must subscribe to for this procedure to be even entertained. 
A jurist making a determination regarding doctrine should refrain from conceptual-
izing law in a specific manner—contract is a force maximizing efficiency in one mo-
ment, and a Kantian manifestation of the will in the next. As Trakman notes above, 
one has to go through “infinite” such iterations before reaching a decision. 
And so we can see that the most important intellectual move that pluralists 
advocate —the endless combination of justifications—necessitates the dissociative 
aesthetic. Which conceptual net should we lay on top of law in order to be able to 
make theoretical claims about it? Pluralists answer that no singular conceptualization 
of the law should be accepted, at least not fully, and never initially. More precisely, 
they argue that we should be ready to embrace them all. In order to use pluralism and 
to make it an operational contract theory, we have to enter the dissociative aes-
thetic—even if only for a moment—and to suspend judgment regarding the very 
form of law.201 
Dissociation is needed in order to consider different contract theories because, 
as we note throughout our discussion on aesthetics, each rationale for contract was 
developed using a specific aesthetic as a starting point. Pluralists thus must support 
entering the dissociative aesthetic (at least before making any claim regarding contract 
doctrine).202 Aesthetic dissociation also explains why pluralism seems so constructive 
and helpful at times, and why it inspires optimism—in at least some contract theo-
rists. Pluralism is unique in that it allows engagement with contract doctrine without 
the hindrance of a fixed perspective: contract is not a rigid conceptual grid, or a force 
on the move, or anything else—at least not yet. All options are available, and jurists 
can choose the mixture they prefer in any specific case to match the particulars of the 
contemplated doctrine. Aesthetically speaking, pluralism in contract theory allows ju-
rists to disassociate from the form of contract itself. 
                                                          
 199. Leon Trakman, Pluralism in Contract Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1031, 1056 (2010). 
 200. Id. 
 201. But perhaps pluralists combine different aesthetics to form a single aesthetic point of view that guides them 
in all encounters with contract doctrine? This interpretation is implausible as a description of what pluralists actually 
do—and recall that we are interested in a descriptive account of contract theories. To make this reading work, we 
need some description of the alleged alternate aesthetic that pluralists use. But how can we even begin to think about 
this aesthetic? It must include rigid conceptual distinctions (for the grid-moments), as well as constant movement, 
history, and an emphasis on the potential future. While perhaps not impossible, this combination does seem implau-
sible: it is difficult to conceptualize all these contrasting characteristics at the same time. 
 202. One may object and argue that pluralists do not combine aesthetics but only normative ideas (promise, reliance, 
efficiency). However, this seems implausible. Remember that in any given theory, substance is interwoven with ― 
steeped in ― aesthetic commitments. This means that when a pluralist chooses between reliance, promise and effi-
ciency, she is also choosing between the energy and the grid aesthetics. Of course, a pluralist can create new theories 
of reliance, promise, etc., based on different aesthetics. But, we must assume that these new theories will be quite 
different than the ones we know and to which we constantly refer.   
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C. The Upshot 
Accepting dissociative thinking brings about some unfortunate consequences. 
We specifically refer to the claim that pluralism is anti-theoretical, about which there 
has been much discussion.203 Of course, pluralists have responded to this charge,204 
but in our opinion, both sides to the debate have been talking past each other. Our 
aesthetic point of view helps explain why this is so (and why it could not have been 
otherwise). 
“With the advent of this dissociative aesthetic,” Schlag reminds us, “we experi-
ence the dissipation of form and the dissolution of identity.”205 What type of being 
can take the form of reliance this day and promise the next? What is it, really? Kreitner 
seems content with the answer that contract has no core, but the problem seems to 
be different, namely that contract has no form. Which begs the question: is contract 
really an object of inquiry? Is it really there? Can we actually point to something (i.e., 
an idea or a group of ideas)—anything—and say that this is contract law?206 Disso-
ciative thinkers cannot answer that question in the affirmative, and pluralists insist 
that we should inhabit that point of view often. The upshot is that “we experience a 
kind of ontological crash—we have lost the identity of the thing we were supposedly 
talking about.”207 And contract scholars of the monist variety are justifiably con-
cerned about such ontological crashes—they are aesthetically conditioned to worry, 
since their inability to objectify contract, with no real substitute, is a threat on a much 
larger scale than the never-ending quarrel over which justification is more worthy of 
our attention could ever present. Here, too, the aesthetic-to-aesthetic discussion takes 
place side by side (or behind) the standard debate. Many involved believe that more 
data, or a more nuanced normative analysis, could solve the puzzle, but our aesthetic 
analysis shows what kind of commitments are tacitly at work, and why rational argu-
ments could never vindicate or rebuke them. 
We hope that these comments show that here too, aesthetics play a major role 
in the theoretical discourse on contracts. The dissociative aesthetic preconditions us 
into accepting pluralism as a plausible conception for thinking about contract. If we 
buy into it—if, that is, dissociative thinking comes naturally to us—pluralism will 
seem like the natural next step. But if we resist dissociative thinking (or at least the 
thought that we should be dissociative much of the time), pluralist contract theory 
will seem like a borderline nihilistic strategy that denies the project of intellectually 
                                                          
 203. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1283-84 (1989) (describing 
Hillman’s pluralism as an “anti-theory counter attack”); Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, supra note 
184, at 922; SMITH, supra note 10, at 158-59; SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 48, at 28 (arguing that the lack of a decisive 
meta-principle is one of most basic difficulties of pluralist theories); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 11, at 543, n.2 
(pluralistic approaches are “least helpful when they are most needed”). See also HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF 
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 14, at 269 (mentioning that a pluralistic conception, which basically lacks a clear theo-
retical hierarchy, might be seen as “atheoretical” or “unrigorous,” and does not offer any certainty). 
 204. See Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, supra note 184, at 922-23.  
 205. Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, supra note 1, at 1093. 
 206. See SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY, supra note 29. 
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constructing our object of inquiry in a way that makes talking about it and explaining 
it coherent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article examined prominent contract theories using a philosophical meth-
odology that highlights how each theory is informed by pre-theoretical, aesthetic 
commitments. Our general contention is that contract theory’s current state of disa-
greement is isomorphous to the battle of aesthetics that rages in and between indi-
vidual lawyers and in the legal community as a whole. This aesthetic struggle, we 
suggest, cannot be conclusively decided. 
Our analysis has limits, as well as advantages. For example, the investigation 
focuses on form rather than substance, which means that it does not include specific 
recommendations for contract doctrine. But on the other hand, shifting attention to 
the way a theory is aesthetically structured sheds light on many theoretical points that 
are usually hidden from sight. As noted throughout the article, we do not intend to 
undermine the general project of constructing a theory of contract law. In fact, this 
Article assumes that exploring the underpinnings of contract theories would make 
them more understandable, and, therefore, more intellectually attractive (and this is 
true even when we discover that certain foundations cannot be rationally defended). 
It is exactly when we cannot explain to ourselves what we are doing that our project is 
undermined. 
If our inquiry shows anything, it is that even though reason is not solely in 
charge in theoretical discussions about contract law, this does not mean that we can-
not have engaging discussions about the theoretical underpinnings of law. On the 
contrary, it is this very fact that is responsible for creating the immense wealth and 
diversification of opinion in the debates about contract. We argue, then, that the bat-
tlefield of conflicting contract theories is better celebrated as a continuing discourse 
in which there is no ultimate victory—perhaps a kind of highly stylized, intellectual-
ized art-form—than a field of absolute rational inquiry, a science of sorts, in which 
some theory must reign supreme for the entire field to have worth. 
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